Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

SQL Injection in SourceCodester Pharmacy Sales and

CVE-2026-7126

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

SQL Injection

CWE:

CWE-74, CWE-89

Impact:

Unauthorized Database Access and Data Manipulation

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

SourceCodester Pharmacy Sales and Inventory System 1.0 contains an SQL injection flaw in the /ajax.php?action=save_category endpoint, where the ID parameter is concatenated into database queries without proper sanitization.

A remote attacker can send crafted requests to manipulate the SQL query, which may lead to unauthorized data access, data modification, or application compromise.

Affected context

The vulnerability appears in the server-side handling of the ID argument in /ajax.php?action=save_category, typically used to create or update category records within the Pharmacy Sales and Inventory System.

It is most relevant in deployments where this AJAX endpoint is exposed to untrusted users (e.g., internet-facing or shared internal networks) and where the backend database queries are built using raw input from HTTP parameters without robust validation or query parameterization.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP endpoint /ajax.php?action=save_category exposed via the web interface.
  • Required access: Ability to send HTTP requests to the application (e.g., via a browser, script, or automated tool); no special local access is required.
  • Input vector: The ID request parameter is controllable by the attacker and is incorporated into SQL statements.
  • Trigger point: Execution of the database query during processing of the save_category operation.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The application appears to construct SQL queries by directly concatenating the ID parameter into the query text, without using prepared statements, parameter binding, or rigorous input validation, allowing crafted input to alter query structure.

Why this happens

This issue stems from dynamically constructing SQL queries using unsanitized user input, mapping to CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection').

Instead of passing the ID value as a bound parameter, the code likely interpolates it into the SQL string, trusting that it is numeric or otherwise benign.

Because no robust neutralization or parameterization is applied, SQL control characters and operators embedded in the ID value can break out of the intended query context and inject additional clauses or statements, leading to unintended database behavior.

Potential impact

  • Unauthorized reading of sensitive pharmacy and inventory data from the database.
  • Modification or deletion of records, including categories, inventory items, or sales-related entries.
  • Creation of new accounts or manipulation of authentication- or authorization-related data, depending on schema.
  • Bypassing of application-level access controls enforced only at the data layer.
  • Potential pivot to remote code execution if the database or environment permits execution of system-level functions or loading of server-side code.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on treating all HTTP parameters as untrusted and preventing them from altering SQL structure:

  • Use parameterized queries or prepared statements for all database interactions, ensuring the ID and similar parameters are bound as data rather than concatenated into SQL strings.
  • Apply strict server-side validation and type checking for identifiers (e.g., enforcing numeric formats and rejecting unexpected characters or patterns).
  • Centralize data-access logic in a thin abstraction layer where secure query-building patterns can be consistently enforced.
  • Implement least-privilege database accounts so that even if a query is abused, it cannot perform high-risk operations beyond what the application genuinely needs.
  • Avoid constructing SQL fragments from raw request parameters; where dynamic behavior is necessary, restrict it to whitelisted values and structures.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically combines code-level analysis and runtime observation:

  • Static analysis: Configure SAST tools or linters to flag string-based SQL concatenation involving request parameters, especially in files handling AJAX or form submissions (such as ajax.php).
  • Code review: During manual review, look for direct use of $_GET, $_POST, or request wrappers in SQL-building code; require a consistent pattern of prepared statements and input validation.
  • Logging and monitoring: Enable detailed database and application logs to detect anomalous query patterns (e.g., presence of SQL keywords in user-supplied fields, unusual WHERE clauses, or errors suggestive of injection attempts).
  • Security testing: Incorporate automated DAST or manual penetration testing that sends crafted payloads to endpoints like /ajax.php?action=save_category to uncover SQL injection behaviors before release.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/y1shiny1shin/vuldb-project/issues/2
vuldb.comvuldb.com/submit/800971
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/359725
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/359725/cti
sourcecodester.comsourcecodester.com/

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. An attacker who can reach the web interface and send HTTP requests to /ajax.php?action=save_category can attempt to exploit this SQL injection over the network.

It depends on how the endpoint is integrated into the application. If the AJAX action is accessible without authentication or with low-privilege accounts, attackers can exploit it from that context. The core requirement is the ability to influence the ID parameter in requests reaching the vulnerable code path.

Refactor database access to use prepared statements or parameterized queries everywhere, ensuring that all user-controlled values (including ID) are passed as bound parameters. Combine this with strict server-side validation enforcing expected types and ranges for identifiers.

Establish a development standard that forbids raw SQL string concatenation with user input, adopt frameworks or libraries that encourage parameterization by default, enforce secure coding guidelines via code review and automated checks, and include regular application security testing focused on injection flaws.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.