Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

SQL Injection in SourceCodester Pharmacy Sales and

CVE-2026-7088

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

SQL Injection

CWE:

CWE-74, CWE-89

Impact:

Data Exposure and Modification via SQL Injection

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

SourceCodester Pharmacy Sales and Inventory System 1.0 contains a SQL injection flaw in /ajax.php?action=save_receiving, where the ID parameter is incorporated into database queries without proper sanitization.

A remote attacker can manipulate this parameter to interfere with SQL queries, potentially accessing or modifying backend data and impacting the integrity of pharmacy sales and inventory records.

Affected context

This vulnerability occurs in the backend AJAX handling endpoint /ajax.php?action=save_receiving of the Pharmacy Sales and Inventory System.

It is present when user-controlled input (the ID parameter) is passed into SQL queries without reliable parameterization or escaping.

The issue typically manifests in deployments where the application is reachable over a network and is connected to a relational database (e.g., MySQL) with read/write access to sales and inventory tables.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP(S) endpoint /ajax.php?action=save_receiving exposed to users or the public Internet.
  • Required access: Ability to send crafted HTTP requests to the vulnerable endpoint (often as an authenticated user if the feature is behind login, though some deployments may expose it to unauthenticated users).
  • Trigger point: Submission of a specially crafted value in the ID parameter that is later concatenated into an SQL statement.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The server-side code likely builds SQL strings by directly embedding the ID parameter without using prepared statements or robust input validation, allowing attacker-supplied fragments to alter the structure of the query.

Why this happens

The root cause maps to CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection') and is related to CWE-74: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component.

The vulnerable code most likely assembles SQL queries through string concatenation, trusting the ID parameter coming from an HTTP request.

When special characters such as quotes, comment markers, or operators in the ID value are not reliably neutralized or parameterized, the database interprets them as part of the SQL syntax rather than as data.

This insecure pattern—dynamic query construction without parameter binding—is the core defect, independent of the specific database engine.

Potential impact

  • May allow retrieval of sensitive information from the database, including customer, sales, and inventory records.
  • Can enable modification or deletion of data, corrupting pharmacy stock, pricing, or transaction history.
  • Could be used to create or escalate application accounts by modifying authentication- or authorization-related tables, depending on schema.
  • Might permit execution of stacked queries or database-specific commands, potentially impacting database availability or integrity.
  • Can provide a foothold for further compromise, such as leveraging database access to discover credentials or internal system details.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on treating all inbound parameters as untrusted and eliminating dynamic SQL construction patterns:

  • Prefer parameterized queries / prepared statements for all database operations, ensuring the ID value is always bound as data rather than concatenated into SQL strings.
  • Apply strict input validation for identifier parameters such as ID (e.g., enforcing numeric-only or UUID formats) and reject or normalize values that do not match expected patterns.
  • Centralize database access code using a data access layer that enforces safe query APIs and discourages ad-hoc SQL building in controllers or AJAX handlers.
  • Limit database account privileges so that the application can perform only the minimal required operations, reducing the blast radius of a successful injection.
  • Adopt secure-by-default frameworks or ORM configurations that make unsafe query construction difficult or clearly discouraged in code review.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically combines code-centric and behavior-centric approaches:

  • Static analysis: Use SAST tools or custom rules to flag SQL queries built via string concatenation, especially where request parameters like $_GET['ID'] or $_POST['ID'] flow into query construction.
  • Code review signals: Look for direct usage of request variables in SQL strings, ad-hoc query assembly in AJAX handlers, and absence of prepared statements or query parameter binding.
  • Dynamic testing: Employ automated or manual SQL injection testing (e.g., fuzzing the ID parameter with special characters and payload patterns) and monitor for anomalies such as SQL errors or unexpected results.
  • Logging and monitoring: Enable database and application logging to detect suspicious query patterns (e.g., unexpected comment markers, logical operators, or stacked statements originating from the save_receiving endpoint).
  • Policy enforcement: Incorporate secure coding guidelines and pre-merge checks requiring parameterized queries for all new or modified database access paths.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/nidieaaa/test/issues/3
vuldb.comvuldb.com/submit/800062
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/359663
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/359663/cti
sourcecodester.comsourcecodester.com/

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. The vulnerable endpoint is accessible over HTTP(S), and an attacker who can reach /ajax.php?action=save_receiving can attempt to exploit the SQL injection by manipulating the ID parameter.

It depends on how the application is deployed. If the AJAX endpoint is behind a login or access control, the attacker would need at least the lowest level of valid credentials. In misconfigured or default deployments where the endpoint is accessible without authentication, anonymous exploitation is possible.

The most robust fix is to refactor the vulnerable code to use prepared statements or parameterized queries for all database interactions involving user input, combined with strict validation of the ID parameter. This removes the dependency on manual escaping and ensures user data cannot alter the structure of SQL commands.

Adopting a secure development standard that mandates parameterized queries, centralizing database access through vetted libraries or ORMs, adding automated static analysis checks, and performing regular code reviews with explicit attention to injection risks are effective strategies. Training developers to treat all external inputs as untrusted and to avoid dynamic query construction is equally important.

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