Summary
SourceCodester Pharmacy Sales and Inventory System 1.0 contains a SQL injection flaw in /ajax.php?action=save_receiving, where the ID parameter is incorporated into database queries without proper sanitization.
A remote attacker can manipulate this parameter to interfere with SQL queries, potentially accessing or modifying backend data and impacting the integrity of pharmacy sales and inventory records.
Affected context
This vulnerability occurs in the backend AJAX handling endpoint /ajax.php?action=save_receiving of the Pharmacy Sales and Inventory System.
It is present when user-controlled input (the ID parameter) is passed into SQL queries without reliable parameterization or escaping.
The issue typically manifests in deployments where the application is reachable over a network and is connected to a relational database (e.g., MySQL) with read/write access to sales and inventory tables.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: HTTP(S) endpoint
/ajax.php?action=save_receivingexposed to users or the public Internet. - Required access: Ability to send crafted HTTP requests to the vulnerable endpoint (often as an authenticated user if the feature is behind login, though some deployments may expose it to unauthenticated users).
- Trigger point: Submission of a specially crafted value in the
IDparameter that is later concatenated into an SQL statement. - Why exploitation is possible: The server-side code likely builds SQL strings by directly embedding the
IDparameter without using prepared statements or robust input validation, allowing attacker-supplied fragments to alter the structure of the query.
Why this happens
The root cause maps to CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection') and is related to CWE-74: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component.
The vulnerable code most likely assembles SQL queries through string concatenation, trusting the ID parameter coming from an HTTP request.
When special characters such as quotes, comment markers, or operators in the ID value are not reliably neutralized or parameterized, the database interprets them as part of the SQL syntax rather than as data.
This insecure pattern—dynamic query construction without parameter binding—is the core defect, independent of the specific database engine.
Potential impact
- May allow retrieval of sensitive information from the database, including customer, sales, and inventory records.
- Can enable modification or deletion of data, corrupting pharmacy stock, pricing, or transaction history.
- Could be used to create or escalate application accounts by modifying authentication- or authorization-related tables, depending on schema.
- Might permit execution of stacked queries or database-specific commands, potentially impacting database availability or integrity.
- Can provide a foothold for further compromise, such as leveraging database access to discover credentials or internal system details.
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on treating all inbound parameters as untrusted and eliminating dynamic SQL construction patterns:
- Prefer parameterized queries / prepared statements for all database operations, ensuring the
IDvalue is always bound as data rather than concatenated into SQL strings. - Apply strict input validation for identifier parameters such as
ID(e.g., enforcing numeric-only or UUID formats) and reject or normalize values that do not match expected patterns. - Centralize database access code using a data access layer that enforces safe query APIs and discourages ad-hoc SQL building in controllers or AJAX handlers.
- Limit database account privileges so that the application can perform only the minimal required operations, reducing the blast radius of a successful injection.
- Adopt secure-by-default frameworks or ORM configurations that make unsafe query construction difficult or clearly discouraged in code review.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection typically combines code-centric and behavior-centric approaches:
- Static analysis: Use SAST tools or custom rules to flag SQL queries built via string concatenation, especially where request parameters like
$_GET['ID']or$_POST['ID']flow into query construction. - Code review signals: Look for direct usage of request variables in SQL strings, ad-hoc query assembly in AJAX handlers, and absence of prepared statements or query parameter binding.
- Dynamic testing: Employ automated or manual SQL injection testing (e.g., fuzzing the
IDparameter with special characters and payload patterns) and monitor for anomalies such as SQL errors or unexpected results. - Logging and monitoring: Enable database and application logging to detect suspicious query patterns (e.g., unexpected comment markers, logical operators, or stacked statements originating from the
save_receivingendpoint). - Policy enforcement: Incorporate secure coding guidelines and pre-merge checks requiring parameterized queries for all new or modified database access paths.

