Summary
SourceCodester Pharmacy Sales and Inventory System 1.0 contains a SQL injection vulnerability in the /ajax.php?action=save_sales endpoint through improper handling of the ID parameter.
A remote attacker can manipulate this parameter to inject arbitrary SQL, potentially accessing, modifying, or deleting backend database data when the vulnerable code path is invoked.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in the server-side processing of AJAX requests to /ajax.php?action=save_sales, where user-controlled input in the ID parameter is incorporated into database queries without sufficient sanitization or parameterization.
This typically manifests in deployments where the application trusts request parameters coming from the browser, and where the database account used by the application has broad privileges over the pharmacy sales and inventory data.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: HTTP(S) endpoint
/ajax.php?action=save_sales - Required access: Ability to send crafted requests to the web application (usually over the network); authentication requirements depend on how the endpoint is exposed in each deployment
- Trigger point: Server-side code that builds and executes SQL statements using the
IDargument from the request - Why exploitation is possible: The application concatenates the
IDparameter directly into SQL queries without using prepared statements or robust input validation, enabling injection of attacker-controlled SQL fragments
Why this happens
The underlying issue is a classic instance of CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection').
Application logic in /ajax.php?action=save_sales appears to construct SQL queries by interpolating the ID parameter directly into the query string.
Because special characters and SQL control tokens are not correctly neutralized and no parameterized queries are used, the database interprets parts of the user input as executable SQL rather than as data.
CWE-74 (Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output) is related in that unsanitized data flows into a downstream interpreter (the SQL engine), but the primary pattern here is direct SQL injection through unsafe query construction.
Potential impact
- Disclosure of sensitive pharmacy sales, customer, and inventory records
- Unauthorized modification or deletion of sales and inventory data
- Creation or manipulation of user accounts and roles stored in the database
- Corruption of transactional records leading to financial or compliance issues
- Potential execution of database-specific functions that could facilitate further compromise of the hosting environment, depending on database configuration and privileges
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation typically focuses on eliminating direct string concatenation in SQL statements and reducing trust in client-supplied data:
- Use parameterized queries or prepared statements for all database operations involving user input, especially the
IDparameter insave_saleslogic - Enforce strict server-side validation and type-checking on identifiers (e.g., ensuring
IDis numeric and within expected ranges before use) - Implement a centralized data access layer that abstracts query building and enforces safe patterns by default
- Restrict the database account used by the application to the least privileges necessary (no superuser/admin roles) to limit impact if an injection occurs
- Apply defense-in-depth with input normalization, allowlists for expected values, and consistent encoding when data crosses trust boundaries
How teams detect issues like this
Detection commonly combines secure SDLC practices with targeted testing:
- Static analysis: Configure SAST tools and linters to flag dynamic SQL construction, string concatenation involving request parameters, and direct use of
$_GET/$_POSTvariables in query strings - Code review: Look for patterns where
IDor other request parameters flow into SQL without parameter binding; verify that all data access paths inajax.phpuse prepared statements and constrained types - Dynamic testing: Use automated scanners and manual penetration testing to probe the
IDparameter on/ajax.php?action=save_salesfor injection behavior (e.g., time delays, error-based responses, or Boolean-based differences) - Runtime monitoring: Enable database logging for anomalous or malformed queries and monitor web application logs for unusual error messages or patterns that suggest tampering with SQL syntax

