Summary
Lemur contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in its ACME certificate-management flow. An authorized authority-role member could redirect ACME requests to attacker-selected internal services or cloud metadata endpoints by changing the ACME server URL without effective revalidation.
Affected context
The issue occurs in Lemur deployments that use ACME authorities and permit an authorized user to update an authority's ACME URL. Risk arises when the resulting ACME directory, order, authorization, or finalization URLs are followed without confirming that they remain on the configured ACME host.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Lemur's authority-management API and outbound ACME client
- Required access: A user authorized to manage the affected ACME authority; global administrator privileges are not required
- Trigger point: Updating the authority's ACME URL and initiating an ACME certificate-management operation
- Why exploitation is possible: The client follows server-provided ACME URLs without enforcing host consistency, allowing requests to reach attacker-selected internal destinations
Why this happens
The vulnerability results from insufficient validation of a mutable network destination combined with unrestricted following of URLs returned during a multi-step protocol flow. Although the initial ACME directory may be configured for one host, subsequent endpoint URLs were accepted without requiring the same host, enabling server-side requests to unintended destinations. This behavior maps to CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery, because attacker-influenced input controls requests made from the Lemur server's trusted network position.
Potential impact
- Internal services could receive requests originating from the Lemur deployment
- Cloud instance metadata or other sensitive endpoints could potentially be queried
- JWS-signed requests could be sent to unintended services
- Internal network information or credentials could potentially be exposed
- Certificate-management workflows could be disrupted or abused
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation typically focuses on binding outbound protocol flows to an explicitly trusted destination and reducing the influence of user-controlled URLs.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Revalidating authority URL changes against an approved scheme, host, and port policy
- Pinning every URL used during an ACME flow to the validated directory host
- Disallowing redirects or cross-host transitions unless explicitly required and independently approved
- Restricting outbound network access from the application to required ACME endpoints
- Blocking access to cloud metadata services and sensitive internal address ranges
- Applying least-privilege permissions to authority-management users and service identities
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can detect SSRF risks through:
- Static analysis rules for outbound requests built from user-controlled URLs
- Code review checks for missing host, scheme, port, redirect, and DNS-rebinding validation
- Tests that verify all URLs returned by a protocol remain within the approved endpoint boundary
- Network egress monitoring for requests from Lemur components to private address ranges, metadata services, or unexpected hosts
- API audit reviews for authority URL changes and subsequent certificate-management activity
- Policy enforcement that restricts outbound traffic to an approved ACME host set

