Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

OS Command Injection in simple-openstack-mcp exec_openstack

CVE-2026-7066

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

OS Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-77, CWE-78

Impact:

Remote Code Execution via OS Command Injection

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A command injection vulnerability in the exec_openstack function of server.py in simple-openstack-mcp allows attacker-controlled input to be passed directly into operating system command execution.

When exposed remotely, this enables an attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the underlying host or container with the privileges of the application process.

Affected context

This issue arises in deployments of the simple-openstack-mcp project where the exec_openstack function in server.py is reachable via a network-accessible interface or API.

The vulnerable context typically involves user-supplied parameters being used to construct and execute shell commands to interact with an OpenStack environment.

The risk is highest when:

  • The service is exposed on untrusted networks, and
  • Inputs influencing command construction are not tightly validated or constrained, and
  • The application process runs with elevated or infrastructure-impacting privileges.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Remote, via HTTP or another network protocol that triggers the exec_openstack path in server.py.
  • Required access: Ability to send crafted requests to the service endpoint that reaches exec_openstack (authentication requirements depend on deployment configuration).
  • Trigger point: Any code path where untrusted input is concatenated or interpolated into a shell command that is subsequently executed by the OS.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The function appears to construct shell commands using unvalidated or unsafely-handled parameters and then invokes them through OS-level execution APIs, enabling injection of additional commands or arguments.

Why this happens

The vulnerability stems from building shell commands by directly embedding user-controlled data into command strings and executing them without sufficient sanitization or safe parameterization.

This design maps to CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection'), and potentially CWE-77: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection').

Insecure patterns often include:

  • Using generic command execution APIs (e.g., os.system, subprocess with shell=True, or equivalent) with string concatenation.
  • Failing to strictly validate, whitelist, or encode parameters that become part of the command line.

Because the OS shell interprets metacharacters such as ;, &, |, or backticks, an attacker can escape the intended command context and run arbitrary commands.

Potential impact

  • Execution of arbitrary OS commands with the privileges of the simple-openstack-mcp service.
  • Unauthorized access to sensitive configuration data, credentials, or OpenStack control interfaces.
  • Modification or disruption of OpenStack resources, including instances, volumes, and networks.
  • Pivoting to other internal systems reachable from the compromised host.
  • Destruction or tampering with logs and evidence of compromise.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation focuses on eliminating unsafe command construction and enforcing strict boundaries between input and execution:

  • Replace shell-based command construction with APIs or SDKs that interact with OpenStack directly, avoiding shell invocation altogether.
  • Where OS commands are unavoidable, use parameterized process execution (e.g., passing argument lists without shell=True) instead of building command strings.
  • Apply strict whitelisting for all parameters that influence commands: limit values to predefined enums, IDs, or patterns and reject anything outside the expected set.
  • Normalize and validate inputs early, rejecting values containing shell metacharacters or unexpected whitespace/control characters.
  • Run the service with least privilege, ensuring that even if command injection occurs, the reachable resources and filesystem are constrained.
  • Isolate the service using containers, chroot, or dedicated accounts to reduce blast radius if exploitation happens.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection can combine code-centric and operational approaches:

  • Static analysis: Configure rules that flag dangerous use of command execution APIs (os.system, popen, subprocess with shell=True, or similar) when they are passed concatenated strings or untrusted variables.
  • Code review: Examine functions like exec_openstack for string-based command construction, especially where network inputs or request parameters are interpolated directly.
  • Security testing: Use dynamic application security testing (DAST) or fuzzing tools to send crafted payloads containing common shell metacharacters and monitor for unexpected behavior or command execution.
  • Runtime monitoring: Instrument hosts or containers with logging and EDR solutions to detect unusual child processes spawned by the service, anomalous command-line arguments, or access to sensitive system utilities.
  • Policy enforcement: Integrate secure coding policies into CI/CD pipelines, rejecting changes that introduce new instances of shell-based command execution with untrusted data.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/choieastsea/simple-openstack-mcp/
github.comgithub.com/choieastsea/simple-openstack-mcp/issues/3
vuldb.comvuldb.com/submit/798622
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/359641
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/359641/cti

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, the vulnerability is remotely exploitable if the exec_openstack functionality is exposed over a network interface and attacker-controlled input reaches the command construction logic.

An attacker needs the ability to send requests to the service endpoint that eventually calls exec_openstack. Whether authentication is required depends on how the deployment protects that endpoint; poorly secured or publicly exposed instances are at higher risk.

The most robust fix is to remove shell-based command execution from this path and instead use a native OpenStack client library or API, passing structured parameters rather than constructing shell commands from strings. If shell interaction is unavoidable, commands should be executed via argument lists without shell=True, and all inputs should be strictly validated or whitelisted.

Establish secure coding guidelines that discourage direct use of shell commands with untrusted data, enforce code review checks around any command execution, and adopt static analysis rules that flag risky patterns. Combining these with least-privilege deployments and automated tests for injection behaviors helps prevent similar vulnerabilities across the codebase.

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