Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

OS Command Injection in Intina47 Context-Sync Git

CVE-2026-7062

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

OS Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-77, CWE-78

Impact:

Remote Code Execution via Command Injection

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Intina47 context-sync up to version 2.0.0 contains an OS command injection vulnerability in its Git Integration component, within the src/git-integration.ts file.

Under certain conditions, attacker-controlled input can be incorporated into shell commands, allowing remote execution of arbitrary system commands on the affected host.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in the Git Integration logic of Intina47 context-sync when user-influenced data is combined with operating system commands.

It most likely appears in code that spawns Git-related subprocesses (e.g., clone, fetch, pull, or status) and passes parameters derived from configuration, user input, or remote data sources without robust sanitization.

The issue manifests when command strings or arguments are constructed dynamically and executed in a shell context where special characters and separators are interpreted.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Network-accessible functionality or API provided by the Git Integration feature of context-sync.
  • Required access: Ability to supply or influence values used by Git-related command execution (e.g., repository URLs, branch names, paths, or additional Git options).
  • Trigger point: Invocation of Git operations in src/git-integration.ts that build and execute system commands using the provided input.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The implementation appears to concatenate untrusted input into command strings or pass it to a shell-executing API without strict validation or safe escaping, enabling attackers to break out of intended parameters and inject additional OS commands.

Why this happens

This vulnerability stems from constructing OS command lines using untrusted data and executing them in a shell context.

Typical patterns include:

  • Using APIs such as child_process.exec/execSync or equivalent with a single concatenated command string.
  • Interpolating user-supplied values directly into command templates (e.g., repository URL or file paths) without robust validation, escaping, or argument separation.

This behavior maps to:

  • CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection'), where meta-characters and separators are not properly handled.
  • CWE-77: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection'), representing the broader command injection class.

The core bug class is the assumption that input used to build shell commands is benign, rather than treating it as untrusted and constraining it to a safe, well-defined set of values.

Potential impact

  • Execution of arbitrary OS commands with the privileges of the context-sync process
  • Reading, modifying, or deleting local files accessible to the service
  • Compromise of application data and credentials stored on the host
  • Use of the compromised system as a pivot for further network attacks
  • Deployment of malware or backdoors on the affected host

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation focuses on eliminating direct command injection opportunities and reducing trust in inputs used for command execution:

  • Prefer high-level Git libraries or APIs that perform version control operations without invoking a shell.
  • When OS commands are unavoidable, use parameterized process-spawning APIs (e.g., functions that accept argument arrays) rather than building a single shell command string.
  • Constrain inputs to a strict allowlist of expected patterns (e.g., known repository identifiers, predefined branches) and reject or normalize unexpected values.
  • Avoid passing user-controlled data to shell interpreters; if necessary, apply robust escaping tailored to the specific shell and platform.
  • Run the service under a dedicated, least-privilege account with minimal filesystem and network permissions to limit blast radius.
  • Centralize command execution helpers that enforce security checks, rather than scattering custom command construction throughout the codebase.

How teams detect issues like this

Effective detection blends static analysis, code review, and runtime safeguards:

  • Use static analysis rules to flag risky APIs (e.g., exec, execSync, shell-based spawn, or similar) when they receive data from request handlers, configuration files, or other untrusted sources.
  • During code review, look for string concatenation or template literals used to construct command lines, especially in Git-related logic, and verify that inputs are validated and arguments are separated safely.
  • Enforce internal secure coding guidelines that require use of safe process-spawning helpers or Git libraries for all version control operations.
  • Implement logging around command execution to capture unusual parameters or patterns that may indicate attempted injection.
  • Consider automated code scanning tools in CI pipelines to block new uses of shell-executing APIs without approved justification and safety checks.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/Intina47/context-sync/
github.comgithub.com/Intina47/context-sync/issues/31
github.comgithub.com/wing3e/public_exp/issues/22
vuldb.comvuldb.com/submit/798614
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/359637
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/359637/cti

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. The description indicates that the attack can be executed remotely, as long as an attacker can interact with the Git Integration feature in a way that influences the data passed to OS command execution.

An attacker must be able to provide or manipulate inputs used by the Git Integration workflow, such as repository configuration or Git parameters. This may require authenticated access if the feature is behind authentication, but the underlying risk comes from control over those inputs.

The safest pattern is to avoid shell execution entirely by using dedicated Git libraries or APIs. If commands must be run, use parameterized process-spawning functions with strict input validation and allowlists, and never build executable command strings by concatenating untrusted data.

Establish secure coding standards that forbid direct shell command construction with untrusted input, mandate the use of safe wrappers or libraries for external tools, incorporate static analysis and code review checks for command execution APIs, and ensure developers understand the risks of shell meta-characters and injection vectors.

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