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CVE-2026-70454

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.0)

TLS Certificate Validation (CWE-295) in rsync TLS Mode

CVE-2026-70454

Awaiting Analysis

Vulnerability type

Category:

Improper Certificate Validation

CWE:

CWE-295

Impact:

Man-in-the-Middle Interception, Data Disclosure, and Session Tampering

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.0)

CVSS version:

3.1

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Summary

A certificate validation vulnerability in rsync TLS connections allows an on-path attacker to present a self-signed or otherwise invalid certificate without being rejected. The attacker may then intercept, decrypt, or modify rsync session data when the client fails to validate the certificate chain and hostname.

Affected context

The vulnerability affects rsync deployments using TLS protection through OpenSSL mode in rsync 3.2.0 through 3.2.3 or through stunnel mode in rsync-ssl through 3.4.4. Risk is present when the client does not validate the server certificate against a trusted certificate authority and does not verify that the certificate hostname matches the intended server.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: TLS-protected rsync client-server communications
  • Required access: Ability to observe and interfere with network traffic between the rsync client and server
  • Trigger point: TLS session establishment before rsync data transfer
  • Why exploitation is possible: The client may accept self-signed or otherwise invalid certificates without enforcing trusted-chain and hostname validation, allowing an on-path attacker to impersonate the server

Why this happens

The underlying bug is improper certificate validation, mapped to CWE-295. The TLS client establishes an encrypted channel without reliably checking that the presented certificate chains to an approved trust anchor and identifies the intended server. Encryption alone does not prevent interception when authentication of the remote endpoint is incomplete.

Potential impact

  • An on-path attacker may decrypt rsync session contents
  • Transferred files may be modified or replaced without client detection
  • Credentials, metadata, or other sensitive synchronization data could be disclosed
  • An attacker could impersonate a trusted rsync server
  • Synchronization integrity and the reliability of backup workflows could be compromised

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing complete TLS peer authentication rather than relying on encryption alone.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Require certificate-chain validation against a controlled and trusted CA store
  • Enforce hostname or service-identity matching for every TLS connection
  • Reject expired, self-signed, revoked, or otherwise invalid certificates unless explicitly trusted through a managed process
  • Avoid disabling certificate verification through configuration or wrapper scripts
  • Use narrowly scoped trust stores and least-privilege credentials for synchronization services
  • Monitor certificate issuance, trust-store changes, and unexpected endpoint changes

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can identify this weakness through:

  • Static and configuration analysis for disabled certificate verification or permissive trust settings
  • Code review checks for TLS clients that omit chain validation or hostname matching
  • Tests using invalid, expired, self-signed, and wrong-host certificates to confirm connection rejection
  • Network monitoring for unexpected TLS endpoints or certificate changes
  • Policy enforcement requiring authenticated TLS configurations for synchronization traffic

Automated security review tools may help flag permissive TLS options, but runtime validation testing is also important.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/RsyncProject/rsync/releases/tag/v3.5.0
github.comgithub.com/RsyncProject/rsync/security/advisories/GHSA-3c3x-ww2w-5r5p
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/rsync-tls-certificate-validation-bypass-via-ssl-openssl-mode

Frequently asked

questions

It generally requires an on-path position, such as control of a network segment, proxy, gateway, or other traffic-interception point. It is therefore network-based but is not typically exploitable by an attacker with no ability to observe or alter the connection.

Not necessarily. The central prerequisite is the ability to interfere with TLS session establishment. Existing authentication controls may not prevent impersonation if the client accepts an invalid server certificate.

Configure the TLS client to validate the complete certificate chain and enforce hostname matching using a controlled trust store. Invalid or unexpected certificates should cause the connection to fail closed.

Treat certificate verification as a mandatory security policy, test failure cases in automated integration suites, review TLS configuration for disabled checks, and monitor trust-store and certificate changes.

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