Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

SSRF in Typecho Pingback Service Endpoint

CVE-2026-7025

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

CWE:

CWE-918

Impact:

Network Pivoting and Internal Resource Access via SSRF

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Typecho (up to version 1.3.0) allows attackers to abuse the Pingback Service Endpoint to make arbitrary HTTP requests from the server.

By manipulating the X-Pingback / link parameter, a remote attacker may coerce the application to access internal or external URLs, potentially reaching services that are not otherwise exposed.

Affected context

The issue arises in Typecho's Ping Back Service Endpoint, specifically in the Service::sendPingHandle function within var/Widget/Service.php.

The vulnerability is present when the application accepts and processes X-Pingback or link values from remote sources and uses them to construct outbound HTTP requests without sufficiently validating or constraining the target.

Deployments that expose the blog publicly and allow pingback or similar link-notification functionality are most at risk, especially when the web server can reach internal network services or cloud metadata endpoints.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Publicly exposed Typecho instances that process pingback or related service requests.
  • Required access: Network-level ability to send HTTP requests to the Typecho application (typically unauthenticated remote access).
  • Trigger point: Supplying a crafted X-Pingback or link value that is later used by Service::sendPingHandle to initiate an outbound HTTP request.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The application trusts user-supplied URLs for pingback handling and forwards them without enforcing strict allowlists, scheme checks, or network egress restrictions, enabling attackers to route arbitrary requests through the server.

Why this happens

This vulnerability stems from insufficient validation and restriction of user-controlled URLs before they are used as targets for server-side HTTP requests.

In Service::sendPingHandle, the X-Pingback/link argument is treated as a legitimate remote endpoint, and the server performs outbound requests based on that value.

This behavior corresponds to CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery, where an attacker can influence the location of a network request initiated by the server, leveraging the server's network position and trust relationships.

Potential impact

  • May allow attackers to reach internal (intranet) services that are not publicly exposed.
  • Could be used to interact with cloud provider metadata services, potentially leading to credential exposure.
  • Can enable port scanning of internal networks by observing response behaviors.
  • Might be used to bypass IP-based access controls or firewalls that trust the application server.
  • Can facilitate information gathering about internal infrastructure and services.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on tightening how outbound requests are constructed and where they can go:

  • Introduce strict allowlists of permissible outbound hosts or domains for pingback-related requests, denying all others by default.
  • Validate and normalize URLs before use, restricting schemes (e.g., allow only http/https) and rejecting IP literals, localhost addresses, and private network ranges where applicable.
  • Decouple user-provided data from direct network calls by passing through validation layers or an internal proxy that enforces routing policies.
  • Reduce the privileges of the web server's network access where feasible, for example by segmenting internal services or limiting egress routes.
  • Provide configuration options to disable pingback or similar remote notification features when not strictly needed.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can approach detection by combining code-centric and operational techniques:

  • Static analysis and code review: Flag code paths where user-supplied URLs or headers feed directly into HTTP client libraries without validation or host restrictions.
  • Configuration and policy checks: Enforce rules that outbound network calls must either use a vetted HTTP client wrapper or go through a controlled proxy, and alert on direct low-level socket/HTTP usage.
  • Runtime monitoring: Log outbound requests including destination host, scheme, and caller, then monitor for unusual internal targets or metadata endpoints originating from the pingback handler.
  • Security testing: Incorporate SSRF-focused tests into application security assessments, including automated scanning with crafted URLs targeting internal IP ranges and non-routable addresses.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/typecho/typecho/
github.comgithub.com/typecho/typecho/commit/96ccfdda4fc1e66ca04a003bf0c71d25864e6a0b
github.comgithub.com/typecho/typecho/releases/tag/v1.3.1-rc
vuldb.comvuldb.com/cve/CVE-2026-7025
vuldb.comvuldb.com/submit/797772
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/359605
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/359605/cti
wang1rrr.github.iowang1rrr.github.io/2026/03/04/CVE-Report-Typecho-v1-3-0-SSRF/

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. An attacker who can send HTTP requests to a vulnerable Typecho instance can attempt to exploit the pingback endpoint remotely by supplying crafted X-Pingback or link values.

Typically only network access to the web-facing application is required; no authenticated account is necessarily needed if the pingback functionality is reachable without login.

The most robust approach is to strictly constrain outbound requests initiated by the pingback service: implement host/domain allowlists, restrict protocols and IP ranges, and ensure all URLs pass through a validation layer before any network call is made. Where pingback is not essential, disabling the feature is a safe option.

Treat all user-influenced URLs as untrusted by default, centralize outbound HTTP logic behind validated wrappers or proxies, enforce egress controls at both the application and network layers, and include SSRF-specific checks in code review, static analysis, and security testing processes.

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