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CVE-2026-69189

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.6)

Broken Access Control (CWE-639) in Hoppscotch APIs

CVE-2026-69189

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Broken Access Control

CWE:

CWE-200, CWE-639, CWE-862

Impact:

Unauthorized data disclosure and modification

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.6)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Hoppscotch APIs allowed authenticated workspace members to access private data belonging to other members and to operate on their history entries without verifying ownership. Depending on the exposed GraphQL path or history operation, an attacker could read request contents, authorization headers, sessions, environment values, and settings, or modify and delete another user's private history.

Affected context

The issue occurs in Hoppscotch workspace functionality where GraphQL paths expose user-associated data and UserHistory service operations process caller-supplied history identifiers. Deployments are at risk when authenticated members can invoke these paths without consistent authorization checks that bind the requested user or history record to the requesting account.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Workspace GraphQL paths and UserHistory service operations
  • Required access: An authenticated workspace membership
  • Trigger point: Requests that retrieve private user data or submit a history identifier to star or remove an entry
  • Why exploitation is possible: The application does not consistently enforce ownership or authorization for the referenced user and history record

Why this happens

The underlying bug is an object-level authorization failure involving user-controlled references to workspace data. GraphQL resolvers and history operations trust the requested object or identifier without verifying that it belongs to the authenticated principal or an explicitly authorized scope. This maps primarily to CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key, with related exposure characteristics covered by CWE-200 and missing authorization checks represented by CWE-862.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may disclose another member's private request history
  • Request bodies, authorization headers, sessions, environment values, or settings could be exposed
  • An attacker could modify or delete another user's private history entries
  • Exposed credentials or sensitive configuration could enable further unauthorized access
  • Workspace confidentiality and trust could be reduced

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation typically focuses on enforcing authorization at every object access and mutation boundary.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Deriving the effective user identity from the authenticated session rather than request parameters
  • Checking ownership or explicit workspace permissions before every read, update, star, or delete operation
  • Applying centralized authorization policies consistently across GraphQL resolvers and service methods
  • Using deny-by-default access controls and least-privilege workspace roles
  • Returning only the fields required for the authorized operation
  • Avoiding exposure of authorization headers, environment values, and other secrets through broad user-data queries
  • Invalidating or rotating sensitive credentials if they may have been disclosed

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations commonly detect this class of issue through:

  • Static analysis and code review checks for database lookups based on client-supplied identifiers without nearby authorization checks
  • Review of GraphQL resolvers for missing ownership predicates and overly broad user-data selections
  • Tests that attempt cross-user reads and mutations using valid identifiers from another account
  • API policy enforcement requiring subject, tenant, and object relationships to be evaluated before access
  • Audit logging for unusual cross-object access attempts, history deletions, and bulk retrieval of private fields
  • Automated security testing and code-review tools that identify insecure direct object references

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/hoppscotch/hoppscotch/commit/9cc980bc4feb1f8e139b23b9de0beed0db72d4b7
github.comgithub.com/hoppscotch/hoppscotch/pull/6409
github.comgithub.com/hoppscotch/hoppscotch/releases/tag/2026.6.0
github.comgithub.com/hoppscotch/hoppscotch/security/advisories/GHSA-p25p-g9jp-7q46

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. It can generally be triggered through exposed application APIs by an authenticated workspace member, provided the relevant endpoint is reachable.

No. The attacker needs a valid account with workspace membership and a way to reference another member's user or history data.

Enforce server-side, object-level authorization for every read and mutation, binding the requested resource to the authenticated user or an explicitly permitted workspace scope.

Use deny-by-default authorization policies, avoid trusting client-supplied ownership values, add cross-user authorization tests, and monitor logs for anomalous object access.

Find out what's already
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