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CVE-2026-69183

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

Rate-Limit Bypass (CWE-290) in Monkeytype API Service

CVE-2026-69183

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Rate-Limit Bypass

CWE:

CWE-290, CWE-307, CWE-644

Impact:

Abuse of protected endpoints, mail bombing, quota exhaustion, and resource exhaustion

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Monkeytype's backend can derive rate-limit keys from client-controlled IP headers before using the trusted proxy-derived client address. An unauthenticated attacker may rotate these headers to obtain a fresh bucket for each request, bypassing request throttling and potentially triggering repeated email operations or resource exhaustion.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in Monkeytype deployments where the backend rate-limit middleware prioritizes cf-connecting-ip or x-forwarded-for values that are not reliably overwritten or sanitized by a trusted reverse proxy. Public endpoints such as password-reset and verification-email handlers are exposed when rate-limit keys can be changed between requests. The risk may vary with deployment topology, proxy configuration, and whether clients can reach the origin directly.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Unauthenticated HTTP access to public backend endpoints protected by the affected rate limiters
  • Required access: No account or prior authentication is generally required
  • Trigger point: Request processing when the rate-limit key is generated from forwarded IP headers
  • Why exploitation is possible: Client-supplied header values can produce a distinct rate-limit bucket for successive requests when a trusted proxy does not normalize or replace them
  • Deployment dependency: The impact of cf-connecting-ip depends on proxy topology, while direct-origin or insufficiently normalized x-forwarded-for paths may remain exposed

Why this happens

The backend trusts client-controlled forwarding headers during rate-limit identity calculation instead of consistently using a value established by a trusted proxy or server-side connection context. This maps primarily to CWE-290: Authentication Bypass by Spoofing, because an attacker can spoof the identity used for an access-control-like safeguard. It also relates to CWE-307: Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts and CWE-644: Improper Restriction of XML External Entity Reference, where applicable categorization may vary by analysis; the direct defect is unsafe trust in request metadata for abuse-prevention controls.

Potential impact

  • Attackers may bypass per-client request throttling
  • Registered users may receive repeated password-reset or verification emails
  • Email delivery, Firebase, or SMTP quotas could be consumed
  • Brute-force protection may be weakened for protected workflows
  • Backend resources may be exhausted through repeated public requests
  • Service availability and operational costs could be affected

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation typically focuses on establishing a trustworthy request-identity boundary and ensuring that rate limits cannot be reset through client-controlled metadata.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Deriving rate-limit keys from the server-observed connection address or a proxy-normalized value
  • Accepting forwarding headers only from explicitly trusted proxy hops
  • Removing, replacing, or rejecting untrusted forwarding headers at the edge
  • Applying layered limits using endpoint, account, device, session, and network signals rather than IP alone
  • Adding quotas and cooldowns to email-triggering workflows
  • Ensuring direct-origin access is restricted when a reverse proxy is required
  • Running abuse controls with fail-closed behavior when proxy identity cannot be established
  • Monitoring and limiting downstream email and messaging provider consumption

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can detect similar issues through:

  • Static analysis and code review rules that flag rate-limit keys derived directly from request headers
  • Tests that vary x-forwarded-for and related headers across repeated requests
  • Proxy-integration tests verifying which headers are trusted, replaced, or removed
  • Policy checks requiring explicit trusted-proxy configuration for forwarded client identity
  • Behavioral monitoring for high-volume requests with rapidly changing apparent client IPs
  • Alerts for unusual password-reset, verification-email, SMTP, or Firebase quota consumption
  • Automated application-security review tools that identify spoofable identity inputs in authorization and throttling logic

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/monkeytypegame/monkeytype/security/advisories/GHSA-c878-p3jh-mmjf

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. Public HTTP endpoints can be targeted without authentication when the deployment accepts client-controlled or insufficiently normalized forwarding headers.

Generally, no. The affected password-reset and verification-email workflows are public, although the attacker may need a registered email address to produce a noticeable mail-delivery impact.

Build rate-limit identities from server-observed or trusted-proxy-normalized values, reject untrusted forwarding headers, and add endpoint- and account-level quotas for email-triggering actions.

Define an explicit trusted-proxy policy, test direct-origin and proxy paths, avoid using raw client headers for security decisions, and monitor both request rates and downstream messaging-provider consumption.

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