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CVE-2026-68558

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.5)

SSRF (CWE-918) in Wekan Outgoing Webhook URL Validator

CVE-2026-68558

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Server-Side Request Forgery

CWE:

CWE-918

Impact:

Unauthorized server-side requests to internal or otherwise restricted network resources

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A server-side request forgery (SSRF) weakness in Wekan's outgoing webhook URL validation allowed specially crafted DNS names to pass hostname-based checks even when they resolved to restricted internal addresses. An attacker who can configure or modify a webhook integration could potentially cause the server to make requests to internal services, depending on the deployment's resolver, network controls, and delivery-path safeguards.

Affected context

The issue occurs in Wekan deployments using outgoing webhook integrations. The URL validator inspected the literal hostname rather than consistently resolving and validating every resulting address, while a separate delivery guard used IPv4-only resolution and duplicated blocklist logic. This created inconsistent enforcement across input validation, DNS resolution, connection establishment, and redirect handling.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Outgoing webhook integration configuration and delivery
  • Required access: Permission to create or modify an integration URL, or another way to influence that configuration
  • Trigger point: Webhook delivery after the configured URL is resolved
  • Why exploitation is possible: A DNS name can appear benign during hostname validation while resolving to a restricted address, particularly when validation and connection-time checks do not share complete all-address-family enforcement

Why this happens

The underlying bug is incomplete SSRF validation caused by trusting the literal URL hostname and maintaining separate, potentially inconsistent address-resolution and blocklist implementations. DNS aliases can conceal the destination address, and IPv4-only resolution can leave other address families or future policy changes handled differently. This maps to CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery, where server-side network requests are insufficiently constrained by destination and connection policy.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may cause Wekan to send requests to internal network services
  • Requests could reach cloud metadata or other restricted endpoints where network access permits
  • Internal service information could be exposed through webhook responses, logs, or observable side effects
  • The application could be used as a stepping stone for reconnaissance or follow-on attacks
  • Redirect handling could expand the reachable destination set if redirects are not independently restricted

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation typically focuses on enforcing one consistent destination policy from URL acceptance through connection establishment.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Resolve all addresses for a destination, including relevant IPv4 and IPv6 results
  • Apply a shared IP validation and blocklist routine to every resolved address
  • Pin the validated address when establishing the connection to reduce DNS rebinding risk
  • Validate each redirect or disable redirects for server-side webhook clients
  • Prefer explicit allowlists for webhook destinations where operationally feasible
  • Treat user-controlled DNS names and URL components as untrusted input
  • Run webhook delivery with least-privilege network access and restrict egress at the platform level
  • Keep URL parsing, resolution, and connection policy centralized to prevent validation drift

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can detect related SSRF risks through:

  • Static analysis rules identifying server-side HTTP clients that accept user-controlled URLs
  • Code review checks for hostname-only validation, IPv4-only resolution, unchecked redirects, and DNS rebinding exposure
  • Tests covering private, loopback, link-local, reserved, IPv6, and DNS-alias destinations
  • Network monitoring for webhook workers contacting internal ranges or cloud metadata services
  • Policy enforcement requiring shared URL-resolution and destination-validation libraries
  • Automated security review tools that flag inconsistent validation between request admission and connection time

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/wekan/wekan/commit/ef845fe4a0adb82af436313310939cd48c0b1347
github.comgithub.com/wekan/wekan/releases/tag/v9.74
github.comgithub.com/wekan/wekan/security/advisories/GHSA-66m2-4wfr-c45p

Frequently asked

questions

Exploitability depends on whether an attacker can create or modify a Wekan outgoing webhook integration and cause it to be delivered. Network egress controls and the delivery guard may limit reachable destinations.

Usually, some authenticated or administrative capability to manage integrations is required, unless another application weakness exposes webhook configuration to an unauthenticated attacker.

Resolve every address for the destination, validate all results with one shared SSRF policy, pin the approved connection target, and independently restrict redirects.

Treat webhook URLs as untrusted input, prefer destination allowlists, test all address families and DNS-alias scenarios, and combine application-level validation with least-privilege network egress controls.

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