Summary
MCMS contains a critical SQL injection vulnerability in the /cms/category/list front-end interface. The size parameter is inserted into a SQL LIMIT clause without parameterization, allowing unauthenticated attackers to alter database queries and potentially execute stacked SQL statements.
Affected context
The vulnerability affects MCMS deployments using version 6.2.0 or earlier when the category-listing interface processes attacker-controlled size values. Risk is greatest where the endpoint is publicly reachable and the application relies on regular-expression blacklist filtering rather than structured query parameterization.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The front-end
/cms/category/listHTTP interface - Required access: No authentication is required when the affected endpoint is exposed
- Trigger point: Processing of the
sizerequest parameter while constructing the category-list query - Why exploitation is possible: The parameter is concatenated into the SQL
LIMITclause, while blacklist filtering does not reliably identify all SQL syntax or keywords
Why this happens
The underlying flaw is the direct interpolation of externally supplied input into a SQL statement. Although the application applies regular-expression blacklist filtering, blacklist-based defenses are incomplete and can be bypassed by syntax that is not covered by the filter. This behavior maps to CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command, because untrusted input is allowed to influence SQL command structure instead of being treated strictly as data.
Potential impact
- Attackers may read, modify, or delete database records
- Attackers could execute multiple SQL statements where the database configuration permits stacked queries
- Sensitive application or user data may be exposed
- Application integrity may be compromised through unauthorized data changes
- Database compromise could enable further impact against connected services
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on removing dynamic SQL construction and reducing trust in request parameters.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Use parameterized queries or database APIs that safely bind values for pagination and limits
- Validate
sizeas a bounded integer before it reaches query-building logic - Avoid regex blacklist filtering as the primary SQL injection defense
- Apply allowlist validation for query options that cannot be bound as parameters
- Limit database credentials to the minimum required operations
- Separate application database accounts and restrict access to sensitive schemas
- Apply consistent authorization and input-validation controls across public endpoints
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations commonly detect this class of issue through:
- Static analysis rules for string concatenation or interpolation in SQL construction
- Code review checks for request parameters used in
LIMIT,ORDER BY, or other query clauses - Dynamic application testing that evaluates unexpected database syntax in numeric and pagination parameters
- Web application firewall and database monitoring policies for anomalous query patterns
- CI policies requiring parameterized database access and bounded input validation
Neutral automated code-review and software-composition tools may help identify unsafe query-building patterns before deployment.

