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CVE-2026-67974

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

Improper Input Validation (CWE-20) in NASA cFS SBN App

CVE-2026-67974

Received

Vulnerability type

Category:

Improper Input Validation

CWE:

CWE-20

Impact:

Denial of Service

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A parser boundary flaw in the Software Bus Network (SBN) application in NASA cFS v7.0.1 can mishandle crafted peer subscription messages. An attacker who can send packets to the relevant SBN message-handling interface may trigger a denial of service, particularly when boundary validation is insufficient.

Affected context

The issue occurs in NASA cFS v7.0.1 deployments that use the Software Bus Network application to process peer subscription messages. Risk is present when crafted network packets can reach the SBN parser and the message fields or lengths are not adequately validated before processing.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: SBN peer subscription message handling
  • Required access: Ability to send packets to the applicable SBN network interface or communication path
  • Trigger point: Parsing and processing of a crafted peer subscription message
  • Why exploitation is possible: Boundary conditions in the parser may permit malformed input to reach unsafe processing logic, potentially disrupting application availability

Why this happens

The underlying bug is an input-validation failure at a parser boundary. Message contents, lengths, offsets, or related constraints may not be sufficiently checked before the SBN application uses them, allowing malformed network data to cause unexpected processing behavior. This maps to CWE-20: Improper Input Validation, where externally supplied input is accepted without enforcing the assumptions required for safe handling.

Potential impact

  • The SBN application may terminate, reset, or become unresponsive
  • Peer subscription processing could be disrupted
  • Dependent cFS services may experience degraded availability
  • Repeated malformed messages could cause sustained denial of service

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing complete validation at every network parser boundary and treating peer messages as untrusted input.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Validate message lengths, offsets, types, and field relationships before access or processing
  • Reject malformed, truncated, oversized, or structurally inconsistent messages safely
  • Use bounded parsing APIs and avoid assumptions about packet completeness
  • Apply rate limits, filtering, and network segmentation to SBN communication paths
  • Run affected services with only the privileges and resources necessary for operation
  • Ensure parser failures are isolated and do not cascade into broader service disruption

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for this class of issue through:

  • Static analysis targeting unchecked length fields, arithmetic on packet boundaries, and out-of-range buffer access
  • Code review signals such as parser logic that dereferences fields before validating message size or type
  • Fuzz testing of peer subscription messages, including truncated, oversized, and inconsistent packets
  • Runtime monitoring for repeated parser errors, application resets, watchdog events, or abnormal SBN availability
  • Network policy enforcement that limits which systems may send SBN control messages

Automated security review tools may help identify missing validation checks, but protocol-aware testing is important for coverage.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/nasa/cFS
github.comgithub.com/nasa/cFS/issues/1074

Frequently asked

questions

It may be remotely exploitable when an attacker can send packets to an SBN interface that accepts peer subscription messages. The practical scope depends on network exposure and filtering.

The available description does not establish an authentication requirement. Access to the relevant communication path and the ability to transmit suitable packets are the key conditions.

Apply strict, bounded validation to message lengths, fields, offsets, and structural relationships before any parsing-dependent operation, and fail safely on invalid input.

Combine protocol-aware fuzz testing, defensive parser design, static analysis, code review, network segmentation, and monitoring for abnormal parser or service behavior.

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