Summary
A vulnerability in the CF_CFDP_RecvMd() component of NASA cFS v7.0.1 may allow an attacker to influence where received CFDP content and data are stored. If an attacker can reach the relevant message-processing path and provide or control storage-location information, sensitive data could be written to an unintended location and later exposed.
Affected context
The issue occurs in deployments using the CFDP receive-metadata handling component of NASA cFS v7.0.1. Risk may arise when received content or data storage locations are derived from attacker-influenced metadata without sufficient validation, authorization, or confinement to approved destinations.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: CFDP message and metadata processing in the CF_CFDP_RecvMd() component
- Required access: Ability to submit, relay, or influence received CFDP metadata, depending on deployment topology
- Trigger point: Processing of receive metadata that determines where content or data is stored
- Why exploitation is possible: Storage-location input may be accepted without adequate validation or enforcement of an authorized destination boundary
Why this happens
The underlying weakness is insufficient control over attacker-influenced storage destinations during received-data processing. When a component uses externally supplied or insufficiently validated location information to select a destination, data may be written outside the intended storage context or exposed to unauthorized consumers. This behavior is consistent with CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor, because data handling can result in information becoming accessible through an unintended location or channel.
Potential impact
- Sensitive received content may be stored where unauthorized users or processes can access it
- Confidential data may be disclosed through unintended files, paths, or storage destinations
- Data isolation boundaries may be weakened
- Downstream systems may consume or expose misplaced received data
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on reducing trust in externally supplied storage-location data and enforcing destination boundaries.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Restricting writes to an allowlisted set of storage destinations
- Canonicalizing and validating paths or identifiers before use
- Rejecting ambiguous, absolute, traversal-based, or otherwise unauthorized locations
- Separating received content by tenant, mission, or security domain where applicable
- Applying least-privilege permissions to processes and storage areas
- Avoiding disclosure of detailed storage paths or sensitive data through logs and error messages
- Enforcing independent authorization checks before data is persisted or made available
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can assess this risk through:
- Static analysis for externally controlled path, filename, or destination values reaching file or storage APIs
- Code review of CFDP metadata handling and destination-selection logic
- Tests using malformed, absolute, traversal-like, and unauthorized destination values
- Runtime monitoring of unexpected writes outside approved storage roots
- Policy enforcement requiring allowlisted destinations and least-privilege storage access
Automated review tools may help identify unchecked external input flowing into storage operations, but findings should be validated against deployment-specific trust boundaries.

