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CVE-2026-67969

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

Improper Input Validation (CWE-20) in NASA cFS HS Monitor

CVE-2026-67969

Received

Vulnerability type

Category:

Improper Input Validation

CWE:

CWE-20

Impact:

Processor Reset and Denial of Service

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

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Summary

An improper input validation vulnerability in the NASA cFS Health and Safety (HS) application's monitoring component allows a crafted application-monitoring table entry to trigger a processor reset. The issue becomes risky when an attacker can supply or alter entries consumed by HS_MonitorApplications(), potentially disrupting system availability.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in the HS_MonitorApplications() component of NASA cFS v7.0.1 when it processes application-monitoring table entries without sufficiently validating their values or structure. Risk depends on whether an attacker can introduce, modify, or otherwise influence the HS.AppMon_Tbl data consumed by the health and safety application.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: The application-monitoring table processing path in the cFS HS component
  • Required access: Ability to supply or alter an HS.AppMon_Tbl entry, directly or through a trusted configuration or update channel
  • Trigger point: Processing of the affected entry by HS_MonitorApplications()
  • Why exploitation is possible: Input values are not adequately constrained before being used by monitoring logic, allowing malformed state to cause a processor reset

Why this happens

The underlying issue is insufficient validation of externally influenced monitoring-table data before it is processed. This maps to CWE-20: Improper Input Validation, where an application accepts input without enforcing the expected format, range, consistency, or semantic constraints. In this case, malformed application-monitoring data can reach control logic that is not resilient to the resulting state.

Potential impact

  • The processor may reset unexpectedly
  • The cFS application or mission workload could become unavailable
  • Repeated triggering may cause a denial-of-service condition
  • Monitoring and fault-management functions may be interrupted
  • Dependent mission operations could experience disruption or delayed recovery

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on treating monitoring-table data as untrusted until it passes complete structural and semantic validation.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Enforcing strict schemas, bounds, enumerations, and consistency checks for table entries
  • Rejecting malformed or out-of-range records before they reach monitoring logic
  • Using fail-safe error handling that reports invalid data without resetting the processor
  • Restricting who and what can create, modify, or distribute application-monitoring tables
  • Applying least-privilege controls to configuration and table-management interfaces
  • Testing invalid, truncated, boundary, and inconsistent table values during integration and fault-injection testing

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can identify similar weaknesses through:

  • Static analysis and code review rules for unchecked table fields, array indexes, numeric ranges, and state transitions
  • Review of all data paths from table-management interfaces to HS_MonitorApplications()
  • Negative testing with malformed, boundary, missing, and inconsistent monitoring entries
  • Runtime monitoring for unexpected processor resets and repeated HS application failures
  • Policy enforcement requiring schema validation and authorization for mission-configuration changes
  • Automated security review tools that flag externally influenced values used without validation

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/nasa/cFS
github.comgithub.com/nasa/cFS/issues/1069

Frequently asked

questions

Exploitability depends on the deployment and control interfaces. It is not necessarily reachable from an arbitrary network position, but an attacker who can influence the application-monitoring table may be able to trigger the vulnerable processing path.

The relevant prerequisite is the ability to supply, modify, or distribute an HS.AppMon_Tbl entry that the HS component will process. The exact access level depends on mission configuration and table-management controls.

Validate table structure and every security-relevant field against strict ranges and expected values before processing. Invalid data should be rejected and logged through a controlled error path rather than causing a processor reset.

Use schema-based validation, least-privilege configuration interfaces, controlled table distribution, boundary-value testing, and runtime monitoring for reset loops or repeated malformed-input failures.

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