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CVE-2026-67917

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

SQL Injection (CWE-89) in AzuraCast Backup Restore

CVE-2026-67917

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

SQL Injection

CWE:

CWE-89

Impact:

Privilege Escalation and Database Manipulation

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

AzuraCast versions through 0.23.7 contain a SQL injection vulnerability in the backup restoration workflow. The restore process executes SQL extracted from a backup archive without sufficient content validation, which may allow a remote attacker with access to the restoration function to alter database data and escalate privileges.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in AzuraCast deployments that use the backup restoration functionality and process database files from uploaded or otherwise attacker-influenced backup archives. Risk depends on whether an untrusted party can submit, replace, or cause the system to restore a crafted archive and whether the restore process runs with access to privileged application data.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: AzuraCast backup restoration functionality
  • Required access: Ability to reach the restore workflow and influence the backup archive or extracted database file
  • Trigger point: Execution of the azuracast:restore command during database restoration
  • Why exploitation is possible: Database content is executed without adequate validation or sanitization, allowing attacker-controlled SQL statements to affect application data and privilege-related records

Why this happens

The underlying flaw is an unsafe trust boundary between backup contents and database execution. The restoration process treats extracted SQL as trusted executable input instead of validating its origin, structure, and permitted operations before execution. This behavior maps to CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command, because attacker-influenced input can alter the intended meaning or effect of database commands.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may modify user, role, or permission records
  • The application could experience unauthorized privilege escalation
  • Sensitive database contents may be disclosed or altered
  • Application integrity could be compromised
  • The service could become unavailable through destructive database changes

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on reducing trust in backup content and preventing arbitrary database commands from being accepted during restoration.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Applying strict archive and database schema validation before restoration
  • Allowing only approved backup formats and expected SQL structures
  • Separating data restoration from privileged account and authorization tables
  • Requiring authenticated, authorized, and auditable restore operations
  • Running restoration tasks with the minimum database privileges needed
  • Isolating restore jobs from production credentials and sensitive services
  • Treating uploaded backups as untrusted files throughout processing

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for this class of issue through:

  • Static analysis of restore code that executes SQL assembled from files or external inputs
  • Code review signals such as direct execution of archive contents without schema or allowlist checks
  • Runtime monitoring for unexpected changes to administrator, role, or permission records
  • Audit policies requiring approval and logging for database restoration operations
  • Automated security review rules that flag untrusted file content reaching database execution APIs

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/luoxuanxi/SQL-Injection-PoC
github.comgithub.com/luoxuanxi/SQL-Injection-PoC/tree/main/SQL-Injection-PoC

Frequently asked

questions

It may be remotely exploitable when an attacker can access the backup restoration workflow and influence the archive or database file processed by that workflow. The practical scope depends on authentication, authorization, and deployment controls.

The attacker generally needs permission to invoke the restore functionality or another way to place an attacker-controlled backup where the restoration process will consume it.

Treat backup contents as untrusted, validate archives and database content against an explicit schema or allowlist, and prevent arbitrary SQL from being executed during restoration.

Restrict restore operations to authorized administrators, isolate restore jobs, use least-privilege database accounts, and monitor changes to privilege-related records and other sensitive tables.

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