Summary
Mira hormone monitor firmware v1.7.1.47 build 01070147 does not adequately authenticate certain Bluetooth Low Energy operations. An unauthenticated attacker within BLE range may rebind a device, access stored hormone measurements, disrupt operation, or track the user through a non-rotating BLE address.
Affected context
The issue affects Mira hormone monitor devices using the identified firmware and exposing device-management or command functionality over Bluetooth Low Energy. Risk is greater when the device accepts account-binding, measurement-access, or command requests without confirming the identity and authorization of the requester, and when stored measurements or BLE identifiers are not adequately protected.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Bluetooth Low Energy communications
- Required access: Physical proximity within the device's approximate BLE range; no authenticated account access may be required
- Trigger point: Device rebinding, measurement retrieval, command processing, or BLE discovery behavior
- Why exploitation is possible: Sensitive operations and protocol commands can reportedly be reached without sufficient authentication or authorization, while measurements are stored or transmitted in cleartext and the BLE address remains static
Why this happens
The underlying issue is insufficient authentication and authorization for security-sensitive device functions, mapping primarily to CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function. The firmware appears to trust nearby BLE clients for operations such as account rebinding, access to stored measurements, and command handling without consistently establishing device ownership or session authority. Related insecure patterns include cleartext handling of sensitive health data, inadequate validation of undocumented opcodes, and failure to rotate identifying BLE addresses.
Potential impact
- An attacker may silently associate the device with an attacker-controlled account
- Stored hormone measurements could be disclosed
- Device operation may be disrupted or unavailable
- Malformed commands could cause crashes or denial of service
- The user may be passively tracked through a persistent BLE identifier
- Exposed health data could enable privacy violations or targeted abuse
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authenticated ownership and authorization for every security-sensitive BLE operation.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Require cryptographic device ownership proof before account rebinding or measurement access
- Use mutually authenticated and encrypted BLE sessions for sensitive data
- Apply strict authorization checks independently to each command and resource
- Validate command structure, opcode ranges, lengths, and state transitions before processing
- Fail safely on malformed or undocumented commands and apply resource limits
- Avoid cleartext storage or transmission of sensitive health measurements
- Use privacy-preserving, rotating BLE addresses where supported by the protocol
- Minimize device privileges and isolate measurement storage from management functions
- Provide explicit user-visible confirmation for ownership changes and security-sensitive actions
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can assess this class of issue through:
- Static analysis and code review for BLE handlers that execute sensitive actions before authentication checks
- Review of account-binding, measurement-access, and command-dispatch state machines
- Protocol testing that sends requests from unauthenticated nearby clients
- Fuzz testing for malformed, unsupported, oversized, or out-of-sequence opcodes
- Verification that sensitive measurements are encrypted at rest and in transit
- BLE privacy testing to confirm that advertising identifiers rotate as intended
- Policy enforcement requiring authenticated ownership transitions and encrypted health-data handling
- Automated security review tools that flag missing authorization gates and cleartext sensitive-data flows

