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CVE-2026-66060

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.1)

Missing Authorization (CWE-862) in Home Assistant App

CVE-2026-66060

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Missing Authorization

CWE:

CWE-862

Impact:

Unauthorized Automation Execution

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Home Assistant's Companion app may accept tag links delivered through an operating system routing mechanism as though they came from a physical NFC or QR scan. Because the app does not validate the calling application or require user confirmation, an untrusted local app may trigger automations associated with authorized tags without the user's awareness.

Affected context

The issue occurs in Home Assistant Companion app deployments that process NFC or QR tag links through OS-level routing. It becomes risky when an untrusted application on the same device can forward an arbitrary tag link and the app accepts it without verifying the caller, confirming user intent, or independently establishing that a physical tag was scanned.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: The Companion app's OS-level tag-link routing and automation handling
  • Required access: Ability to run or control an untrusted application on the same device
  • Trigger point: Processing of a forwarded NFC or QR tag link
  • Why exploitation is possible: The app treats forwarded tag data as an authorized physical scan without caller authentication or user confirmation

Why this happens

The underlying flaw is an authorization failure mapped to CWE-862: Missing Authorization. The application trusts a security-sensitive event based on its apparent format or routing path, but does not verify whether the originating application is trusted or whether the user intentionally performed the associated action. This allows an untrusted local caller to invoke functionality reserved for legitimate tag scans.

Potential impact

  • Automations may execute without user awareness or consent
  • Security-sensitive actions could be triggered through unauthorized local applications
  • Connected devices, locks, alarms, or other home systems may be changed
  • Household privacy, safety, or availability could be affected

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on authenticating event origins and treating externally routed links as untrusted input.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Require explicit user confirmation for automation-triggering links received through external routing
  • Distinguish verified physical scans from links supplied by other applications
  • Restrict sensitive automations behind additional authentication or authorization checks
  • Apply least privilege to automation actions and connected-device integrations
  • Use secure-by-default policies that deny externally supplied triggers unless their provenance is verified
  • Reduce trust in OS-level intents and validate their origin, context, and intended recipient

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can assess this class of issue through:

  • Static analysis and code review checks for automation triggers that lack caller or user-intent validation
  • Tests that submit tag links through untrusted application and OS-routing paths
  • Review of intent, deep-link, and URI handlers that invoke privileged actions
  • Policy enforcement requiring confirmation or authorization before sensitive automations execute
  • Audit logging and monitoring for tag-triggered actions that occur without corresponding physical-scan evidence

Automated application-security review tools may help identify externally reachable handlers that invoke privileged functionality without authorization checks.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/home-assistant/android/commit/968b49c58e4eba4d06371a3f6e73198ec6c8d4a7
github.comgithub.com/home-assistant/core/security/advisories/GHSA-2xqv-hwrf-983f

Frequently asked

questions

Exploitation generally requires an untrusted application running on the same device and is therefore local to the device rather than directly remote over the network.

Not necessarily. The relevant access is the ability to cause the Companion app to process a crafted tag link through the device's OS-level routing mechanism.

Treat externally routed tag links as untrusted, verify their origin and context, and require explicit user confirmation or stronger authorization before executing sensitive automations.

Test deep links and OS-level intents against untrusted callers, separate verified physical events from forwarded links, and apply least privilege and additional authorization to high-impact automations.

Find out what's already
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