Summary
NVIDIA AIStore for Linux contains a missing authentication control on its token-revocation endpoint. An unauthenticated remote attacker may submit crafted token-revocation lists, potentially causing data tampering or denial of service when the endpoint is reachable.
NVIDIA AIStore for Linux contains a missing authentication control on its token-revocation endpoint. An unauthenticated remote attacker may submit crafted token-revocation lists, potentially causing data tampering or denial of service when the endpoint is reachable.
Affected context
The vulnerability may affect AIStore deployments that expose the token-revocation endpoint over a network without requiring authentication. Risk is higher when the endpoint accepts externally supplied revocation data and lacks authorization checks before processing requests.
The vulnerability may affect AIStore deployments that expose the token-revocation endpoint over a network without requiring authentication. Risk is higher when the endpoint accepts externally supplied revocation data and lacks authorization checks before processing requests.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Network-accessible token-revocation endpoint
- Required access: No prior authentication may be required
- Trigger point: Submission and processing of a crafted token-revocation list
- Why exploitation is possible: The endpoint may process security-sensitive input without first verifying the caller's identity and authorization
- Attack surface: Network-accessible token-revocation endpoint
- Required access: No prior authentication may be required
- Trigger point: Submission and processing of a crafted token-revocation list
- Why exploitation is possible: The endpoint may process security-sensitive input without first verifying the caller's identity and authorization
Why this happens
The underlying issue is an omitted authentication or authorization check on a security-sensitive API operation. This behavior maps to CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function, because the token-revocation endpoint may accept requests from unauthenticated clients instead of restricting the operation to trusted principals. Processing attacker-controlled revocation data can then affect token state or service availability.
The underlying issue is an omitted authentication or authorization check on a security-sensitive API operation. This behavior maps to CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function, because the token-revocation endpoint may accept requests from unauthenticated clients instead of restricting the operation to trusted principals. Processing attacker-controlled revocation data can then affect token state or service availability.
Potential impact
- An attacker may tamper with token-revocation data
- Legitimate tokens or sessions could be invalidated
- The service may experience denial of service
- Downstream clients may be unable to authenticate or access data
- Security monitoring and trust decisions could be disrupted
- An attacker may tamper with token-revocation data
- Legitimate tokens or sessions could be invalidated
- The service may experience denial of service
- Downstream clients may be unable to authenticate or access data
- Security monitoring and trust decisions could be disrupted
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on ensuring that security-sensitive token-management operations require authenticated and authorized callers.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Enforcing authentication and fine-grained authorization before processing revocation requests
- Applying secure-by-default access controls to administrative and token-management endpoints
- Validating the structure, scope, and provenance of revocation-list data
- Reducing trust in client-supplied security state and using controlled server-side sources where practical
- Limiting service privileges and isolating token-management functions from unrelated data operations
- Applying rate limits, request-size limits, and resilient error handling to reduce denial-of-service impact
Mitigation generally focuses on ensuring that security-sensitive token-management operations require authenticated and authorized callers.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Enforcing authentication and fine-grained authorization before processing revocation requests
- Applying secure-by-default access controls to administrative and token-management endpoints
- Validating the structure, scope, and provenance of revocation-list data
- Reducing trust in client-supplied security state and using controlled server-side sources where practical
- Limiting service privileges and isolating token-management functions from unrelated data operations
- Applying rate limits, request-size limits, and resilient error handling to reduce denial-of-service impact
How teams detect issues like this
Detection approaches may include:
- Static analysis and API policy checks for sensitive routes lacking authentication middleware
- Code review of token-management handlers and their request-processing order
- Integration tests that verify unauthenticated requests are rejected before input processing
- Runtime monitoring for anonymous access attempts and unusual token-revocation activity
- Policy enforcement requiring authentication, authorization, validation, and audit logging for security-sensitive endpoints
Automated security review tools can help identify routes whose protection requirements are missing or inconsistently applied.
Detection approaches may include:
- Static analysis and API policy checks for sensitive routes lacking authentication middleware
- Code review of token-management handlers and their request-processing order
- Integration tests that verify unauthenticated requests are rejected before input processing
- Runtime monitoring for anonymous access attempts and unusual token-revocation activity
- Policy enforcement requiring authentication, authorization, validation, and audit logging for security-sensitive endpoints
Automated security review tools can help identify routes whose protection requirements are missing or inconsistently applied.
Sources
| Source | Link |
|---|---|
| github. | github.com/ |
| nvd. | nvd.nist.gov/ |
| cve. | cve.org/ |
