Summary
NVIDIA AIStore for Linux contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in its experimental HT backend. An unauthenticated remote attacker may submit a crafted original URL to cause the server to make unintended requests, potentially disclosing information accessible from the server's network position.
NVIDIA AIStore for Linux contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in its experimental HT backend. An unauthenticated remote attacker may submit a crafted original URL to cause the server to make unintended requests, potentially disclosing information accessible from the server's network position.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in deployments that enable or expose the experimental HT backend and allow it to process attacker-controlled original URLs. Risk is increased when the AIStore server can reach internal services, cloud metadata endpoints, administrative interfaces, or other network locations that are not directly accessible to the attacker.
The vulnerability occurs in deployments that enable or expose the experimental HT backend and allow it to process attacker-controlled original URLs. Risk is increased when the AIStore server can reach internal services, cloud metadata endpoints, administrative interfaces, or other network locations that are not directly accessible to the attacker.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Network-accessible AIStore experimental HT backend
- Required access: No authentication may be required when the affected endpoint is reachable
- Trigger point: Processing of a crafted original URL by the HT backend
- Why exploitation is possible: The server may accept attacker-controlled URL destinations without sufficiently restricting which hosts, schemes, ports, or network ranges it can access
- Attack surface: Network-accessible AIStore experimental HT backend
- Required access: No authentication may be required when the affected endpoint is reachable
- Trigger point: Processing of a crafted original URL by the HT backend
- Why exploitation is possible: The server may accept attacker-controlled URL destinations without sufficiently restricting which hosts, schemes, ports, or network ranges it can access
Why this happens
The underlying issue is server-side request forgery, mapped to CWE-918. The affected request-handling behavior can cause the server to interpret an attacker-supplied URL as a destination for an outbound request without enforcing an adequately restrictive destination policy. This allows the attacker to use the server as a network proxy toward resources reachable from its execution environment.
The underlying issue is server-side request forgery, mapped to CWE-918. The affected request-handling behavior can cause the server to interpret an attacker-supplied URL as a destination for an outbound request without enforcing an adequately restrictive destination policy. This allows the attacker to use the server as a network proxy toward resources reachable from its execution environment.
Potential impact
- The attacker may retrieve information from internal services
- Cloud or platform metadata may be exposed if reachable
- Internal administrative endpoints could be queried
- Network topology or service details may be disclosed
- The server's network position could be abused to bypass external access restrictions
- The attacker may retrieve information from internal services
- Cloud or platform metadata may be exposed if reachable
- Internal administrative endpoints could be queried
- Network topology or service details may be disclosed
- The server's network position could be abused to bypass external access restrictions
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on reducing trust in user-controlled URLs and enforcing explicit outbound destination controls.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Allowing requests only to explicitly approved schemes, hosts, ports, and paths
- Blocking loopback, link-local, private, multicast, and other restricted address ranges
- Resolving and validating destinations before connection, including protections against DNS rebinding
- Avoiding unnecessary outbound connectivity from the service
- Applying egress firewall policies and network segmentation
- Preventing access to cloud metadata and administrative interfaces from application workloads
- Running the service with only the network and filesystem privileges it requires
Mitigation generally focuses on reducing trust in user-controlled URLs and enforcing explicit outbound destination controls.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Allowing requests only to explicitly approved schemes, hosts, ports, and paths
- Blocking loopback, link-local, private, multicast, and other restricted address ranges
- Resolving and validating destinations before connection, including protections against DNS rebinding
- Avoiding unnecessary outbound connectivity from the service
- Applying egress firewall policies and network segmentation
- Preventing access to cloud metadata and administrative interfaces from application workloads
- Running the service with only the network and filesystem privileges it requires
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for SSRF exposure through:
- Static analysis of URL-fetching code that uses request destinations derived from client input
- Code review checks for missing host, scheme, port, redirect, and private-network validation
- Tests covering loopback, link-local, private, metadata, alternate-address, and redirect-based destinations
- Network monitoring for unexpected outbound requests from AIStore processes
- Egress policy enforcement and alerts for connections to restricted address ranges
- Automated security review tools that identify unrestricted URL construction or fetch behavior
Organizations can look for SSRF exposure through:
- Static analysis of URL-fetching code that uses request destinations derived from client input
- Code review checks for missing host, scheme, port, redirect, and private-network validation
- Tests covering loopback, link-local, private, metadata, alternate-address, and redirect-based destinations
- Network monitoring for unexpected outbound requests from AIStore processes
- Egress policy enforcement and alerts for connections to restricted address ranges
- Automated security review tools that identify unrestricted URL construction or fetch behavior
Sources
| Source | Link |
|---|---|
| github. | github.com/ |
| nvd. | nvd.nist.gov/ |
| cve. | cve.org/ |
