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CVE-2026-65151

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.4)

SQL Injection (CWE-89) in NVIDIA NeMo Agent Toolkit

CVE-2026-65151

Awaiting Analysis

Vulnerability type

Category:

SQL Injection

CWE:

CWE-89

Impact:

Data Tampering, Information Disclosure, and Denial of Service

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.4)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

NVIDIA NeMo Agent Toolkit contains a SQL injection vulnerability that may allow an attacker to interfere with database queries through insufficiently protected input.

Successful exploitation could enable data tampering, information disclosure, or denial of service when vulnerable database-backed functionality is reachable.

NVIDIA NeMo Agent Toolkit contains a SQL injection vulnerability that may allow an attacker to interfere with database queries through insufficiently protected input.

Successful exploitation could enable data tampering, information disclosure, or denial of service when vulnerable database-backed functionality is reachable.

Affected context

The vulnerability may occur in NeMo Agent Toolkit functionality that incorporates attacker-influenced data into SQL statements without adequate parameterization or validation. Risk depends on whether the affected database interface is exposed, whether untrusted input reaches the query construction path, and the permissions available to the application database account.

The vulnerability may occur in NeMo Agent Toolkit functionality that incorporates attacker-influenced data into SQL statements without adequate parameterization or validation. Risk depends on whether the affected database interface is exposed, whether untrusted input reaches the query construction path, and the permissions available to the application database account.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: A database-backed NeMo Agent Toolkit component that processes externally influenced input
  • Required access: Ability to submit or control input accepted by the affected functionality; authentication requirements depend on deployment configuration
  • Trigger point: Processing the input in a database query path
  • Why exploitation is possible: Untrusted data may be combined with SQL commands rather than being handled strictly as a query parameter
  • Attack surface: A database-backed NeMo Agent Toolkit component that processes externally influenced input
  • Required access: Ability to submit or control input accepted by the affected functionality; authentication requirements depend on deployment configuration
  • Trigger point: Processing the input in a database query path
  • Why exploitation is possible: Untrusted data may be combined with SQL commands rather than being handled strictly as a query parameter

Why this happens

The underlying bug is improper separation between data and SQL instructions. When application-controlled and attacker-controlled values are concatenated or otherwise inserted into SQL statements without safe parameter binding, crafted input can alter the intended query structure.

This behavior maps to CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection').

The underlying bug is improper separation between data and SQL instructions. When application-controlled and attacker-controlled values are concatenated or otherwise inserted into SQL statements without safe parameter binding, crafted input can alter the intended query structure.

This behavior maps to CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection').

Potential impact

  • An attacker may disclose information from accessible database tables.
  • An attacker could modify or delete stored data.
  • Database-backed functionality may become unavailable, causing denial of service.
  • Exposed database credentials or application secrets may be revealed if they are stored in accessible records.
  • Broader compromise could occur if the database account has excessive privileges or supports dangerous secondary functionality.
  • An attacker may disclose information from accessible database tables.
  • An attacker could modify or delete stored data.
  • Database-backed functionality may become unavailable, causing denial of service.
  • Exposed database credentials or application secrets may be revealed if they are stored in accessible records.
  • Broader compromise could occur if the database account has excessive privileges or supports dangerous secondary functionality.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on preserving a strict separation between query structure and input data.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Use parameterized queries, prepared statements, or safe query-builder interfaces by default.
  • Avoid constructing SQL through string concatenation or interpolation.
  • Apply allowlist validation to identifiers such as table names, sort fields, and filter operators when dynamic SQL is unavoidable.
  • Reduce database-account privileges to only the operations and records required by the application.
  • Minimize trust in externally supplied values and validate inputs at appropriate service boundaries.
  • Use secure-by-default database access abstractions and centralize query construction.
  • Prevent sensitive data from being returned unnecessarily and apply appropriate authorization checks.

Mitigation generally focuses on preserving a strict separation between query structure and input data.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Use parameterized queries, prepared statements, or safe query-builder interfaces by default.
  • Avoid constructing SQL through string concatenation or interpolation.
  • Apply allowlist validation to identifiers such as table names, sort fields, and filter operators when dynamic SQL is unavoidable.
  • Reduce database-account privileges to only the operations and records required by the application.
  • Minimize trust in externally supplied values and validate inputs at appropriate service boundaries.
  • Use secure-by-default database access abstractions and centralize query construction.
  • Prevent sensitive data from being returned unnecessarily and apply appropriate authorization checks.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection approaches may include:

  • Static analysis rules that flag string concatenation, interpolation, or formatting used to construct SQL statements.
  • Code review checks for missing parameter binding and dynamically selected identifiers.
  • Runtime testing with harmless unexpected input to verify that query structure cannot be altered.
  • Database monitoring for anomalous query patterns, unexpected errors, unusual data access, and high-volume requests.
  • Policy enforcement requiring approved database-access libraries and parameterized-query APIs.
  • Automated code review or software composition analysis tools may help identify related query-construction risks.

Detection approaches may include:

  • Static analysis rules that flag string concatenation, interpolation, or formatting used to construct SQL statements.
  • Code review checks for missing parameter binding and dynamically selected identifiers.
  • Runtime testing with harmless unexpected input to verify that query structure cannot be altered.
  • Database monitoring for anomalous query patterns, unexpected errors, unusual data access, and high-volume requests.
  • Policy enforcement requiring approved database-access libraries and parameterized-query APIs.
  • Automated code review or software composition analysis tools may help identify related query-construction risks.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/NVIDIA/product-security/tree/main/2026/5912
nvd.nist.govnvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-65151
cve.orgcve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-65151

Frequently asked

questions

It may be remotely exploitable when an exposed NeMo Agent Toolkit interface accepts attacker-controlled input that reaches the affected database query path. The precise scope depends on deployment exposure and authentication controls.

Not necessarily. Authentication requirements depend on which component is affected and how access is configured, but the ability to influence query input is required.

Use parameterized queries or prepared statements so input remains data rather than becoming part of SQL syntax. Dynamic identifiers should be strictly allowlisted.

Standardize secure database-access abstractions, enforce least-privilege database accounts, review query construction during development, and include SQL injection testing in CI and security assessments.

It may be remotely exploitable when an exposed NeMo Agent Toolkit interface accepts attacker-controlled input that reaches the affected database query path. The precise scope depends on deployment exposure and authentication controls.

Not necessarily. Authentication requirements depend on which component is affected and how access is configured, but the ability to influence query input is required.

Use parameterized queries or prepared statements so input remains data rather than becoming part of SQL syntax. Dynamic identifiers should be strictly allowlisted.

Standardize secure database-access abstractions, enforce least-privilege database accounts, review query construction during development, and include SQL injection testing in CI and security assessments.

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