Summary
NVIDIA Model-Optimizer contains an unsafe deserialization vulnerability that may allow untrusted data to trigger arbitrary code execution. Depending on the deployment and privileges available to the affected process, exploitation could also result in data tampering, denial of service, or information disclosure.
NVIDIA Model-Optimizer contains an unsafe deserialization vulnerability that may allow untrusted data to trigger arbitrary code execution. Depending on the deployment and privileges available to the affected process, exploitation could also result in data tampering, denial of service, or information disclosure.
Affected context
The vulnerability may occur in NVIDIA Model-Optimizer when serialized data from an untrusted or insufficiently protected source is processed by the application. Risk is higher when attackers can supply, replace, or influence model, configuration, checkpoint, or other serialized artifacts consumed during optimization workflows.
The vulnerability may occur in NVIDIA Model-Optimizer when serialized data from an untrusted or insufficiently protected source is processed by the application. Risk is higher when attackers can supply, replace, or influence model, configuration, checkpoint, or other serialized artifacts consumed during optimization workflows.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Model-optimization workflows or interfaces that process serialized input
- Required access: Ability to provide, modify, or influence data consumed by the affected deserialization path
- Trigger point: Deserialization of the attacker-influenced data
- Why exploitation is possible: The deserialization process may reconstruct unsafe objects or invoke unintended behavior before the data is fully trusted or constrained
- Attack surface: Model-optimization workflows or interfaces that process serialized input
- Required access: Ability to provide, modify, or influence data consumed by the affected deserialization path
- Trigger point: Deserialization of the attacker-influenced data
- Why exploitation is possible: The deserialization process may reconstruct unsafe objects or invoke unintended behavior before the data is fully trusted or constrained
Why this happens
The underlying issue is the use of a deserialization mechanism that can interpret untrusted serialized data as executable object structure rather than treating it solely as inert data. This behavior maps to CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data, because attacker-controlled input may influence object construction and associated application behavior.
The underlying issue is the use of a deserialization mechanism that can interpret untrusted serialized data as executable object structure rather than treating it solely as inert data. This behavior maps to CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data, because attacker-controlled input may influence object construction and associated application behavior.
Potential impact
- An attacker may execute code in the context of the Model-Optimizer process
- An attacker could tamper with models, optimization artifacts, or other data
- The affected service may experience denial of service
- Sensitive information accessible to the process could be disclosed
- Compromise could enable further activity depending on connected systems and process privileges
- An attacker may execute code in the context of the Model-Optimizer process
- An attacker could tamper with models, optimization artifacts, or other data
- The affected service may experience denial of service
- Sensitive information accessible to the process could be disclosed
- Compromise could enable further activity depending on connected systems and process privileges
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on removing unsafe deserialization paths and reducing trust in serialized artifacts.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Prefer safe, data-only serialization formats and restricted parsers
- Permit deserialization only for explicitly defined types and schemas
- Validate provenance, integrity, and expected structure before processing artifacts
- Avoid loading serialized data from writable or untrusted locations
- Run optimization workflows with least-privilege identities and isolated filesystem and network access
- Treat model and checkpoint artifacts as untrusted until verified
Mitigation generally focuses on removing unsafe deserialization paths and reducing trust in serialized artifacts.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Prefer safe, data-only serialization formats and restricted parsers
- Permit deserialization only for explicitly defined types and schemas
- Validate provenance, integrity, and expected structure before processing artifacts
- Avoid loading serialized data from writable or untrusted locations
- Run optimization workflows with least-privilege identities and isolated filesystem and network access
- Treat model and checkpoint artifacts as untrusted until verified
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can assess this risk through:
- Static analysis for generic or unsafe deserialization APIs
- Code review of model, checkpoint, configuration, and artifact-loading paths
- Checks for deserialization occurring before authentication, integrity verification, or schema validation
- Policy enforcement requiring approved data-only formats and restricted object types
- Runtime monitoring for unexpected child processes, filesystem changes, network connections, or abnormal resource consumption
- Automated security review tools that flag CWE-502 patterns during development
Organizations can assess this risk through:
- Static analysis for generic or unsafe deserialization APIs
- Code review of model, checkpoint, configuration, and artifact-loading paths
- Checks for deserialization occurring before authentication, integrity verification, or schema validation
- Policy enforcement requiring approved data-only formats and restricted object types
- Runtime monitoring for unexpected child processes, filesystem changes, network connections, or abnormal resource consumption
- Automated security review tools that flag CWE-502 patterns during development
Sources
| Source | Link |
|---|---|
| github. | github.com/ |
| nvd. | nvd.nist.gov/ |
| cve. | cve.org/ |
