Summary
NVIDIA AIStore for Linux contains a path traversal vulnerability in its target-side object rename handler. An unauthenticated remote attacker may submit a crafted destination path to create or overwrite files outside the intended directory, potentially enabling code execution, privilege escalation, information disclosure, data tampering, or denial of service.
NVIDIA AIStore for Linux contains a path traversal vulnerability in its target-side object rename handler. An unauthenticated remote attacker may submit a crafted destination path to create or overwrite files outside the intended directory, potentially enabling code execution, privilege escalation, information disclosure, data tampering, or denial of service.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in AIStore target services that expose the object rename operation to remote clients. It becomes risky when the rename destination is accepted from an unauthenticated request and is used to construct a filesystem path without reliably constraining the resolved path to the designated storage directory.
The vulnerability occurs in AIStore target services that expose the object rename operation to remote clients. It becomes risky when the rename destination is accepted from an unauthenticated request and is used to construct a filesystem path without reliably constraining the resolved path to the designated storage directory.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Network-accessible AIStore target-side object rename handler
- Required access: Network connectivity to the affected target; authentication may not be required
- Trigger point: Processing of a rename request containing a crafted destination path
- Why exploitation is possible: The destination is insufficiently restricted after path resolution, allowing filesystem operations to escape the intended directory
- Attack surface: Network-accessible AIStore target-side object rename handler
- Required access: Network connectivity to the affected target; authentication may not be required
- Trigger point: Processing of a rename request containing a crafted destination path
- Why exploitation is possible: The destination is insufficiently restricted after path resolution, allowing filesystem operations to escape the intended directory
Why this happens
The underlying bug is improper pathname limitation, mapped to CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory. The handler treats a client-controlled rename destination as a valid storage path without applying robust canonicalization and containment checks, allowing path components to influence filesystem locations outside the permitted directory. This insecure pattern can turn an object-management operation into an arbitrary file write primitive.
The underlying bug is improper pathname limitation, mapped to CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory. The handler treats a client-controlled rename destination as a valid storage path without applying robust canonicalization and containment checks, allowing path components to influence filesystem locations outside the permitted directory. This insecure pattern can turn an object-management operation into an arbitrary file write primitive.
Potential impact
- An attacker may create or overwrite files outside the intended object-storage directory.
- Arbitrary file modification could enable code execution under the service account.
- The vulnerability could support privilege escalation if privileged files become writable.
- Sensitive files may be disclosed or altered through related file-handling behavior.
- Data integrity, service availability, or storage contents may be affected.
- An attacker may create or overwrite files outside the intended object-storage directory.
- Arbitrary file modification could enable code execution under the service account.
- The vulnerability could support privilege escalation if privileged files become writable.
- Sensitive files may be disclosed or altered through related file-handling behavior.
- Data integrity, service availability, or storage contents may be affected.
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing a strict filesystem trust boundary for all rename destinations.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Resolve candidate paths canonically and verify that the final path remains within the approved storage root.
- Reject traversal components, ambiguous separators, absolute paths, and platform-specific alternate path forms.
- Prefer opaque object identifiers or server-generated destination names over client-selected filesystem paths.
- Apply strict allowlisting and schema validation before performing filesystem operations.
- Run storage services with the minimum filesystem and operating-system privileges required.
- Use filesystem permissions, isolation, and policy controls to limit the consequences of an unintended write.
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing a strict filesystem trust boundary for all rename destinations.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Resolve candidate paths canonically and verify that the final path remains within the approved storage root.
- Reject traversal components, ambiguous separators, absolute paths, and platform-specific alternate path forms.
- Prefer opaque object identifiers or server-generated destination names over client-selected filesystem paths.
- Apply strict allowlisting and schema validation before performing filesystem operations.
- Run storage services with the minimum filesystem and operating-system privileges required.
- Use filesystem permissions, isolation, and policy controls to limit the consequences of an unintended write.
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for:
- Static analysis findings involving client-controlled path concatenation, rename, move, or file-write operations.
- Code review signals such as missing canonicalization, prefix-only containment checks, or validation performed before path normalization.
- Tests covering traversal sequences, absolute paths, encoded separators, symbolic links, and platform-specific path representations.
- Runtime telemetry showing rename requests targeting unexpected directories or filesystem locations.
- Network and authorization policies that restrict exposure of administrative or object-management endpoints.
Automated security scanning and policy enforcement tools can help identify unsafe path handling during code review and continuous integration.
Organizations can look for:
- Static analysis findings involving client-controlled path concatenation, rename, move, or file-write operations.
- Code review signals such as missing canonicalization, prefix-only containment checks, or validation performed before path normalization.
- Tests covering traversal sequences, absolute paths, encoded separators, symbolic links, and platform-specific path representations.
- Runtime telemetry showing rename requests targeting unexpected directories or filesystem locations.
- Network and authorization policies that restrict exposure of administrative or object-management endpoints.
Automated security scanning and policy enforcement tools can help identify unsafe path handling during code review and continuous integration.
Sources
| Source | Link |
|---|---|
| github. | github.com/ |
| nvd. | nvd.nist.gov/ |
| cve. | cve.org/ |
