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CVE-2026-65101

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.6)

SSRF (CWE-918) in NVIDIA AIStore Distributed Sort Component

CVE-2026-65101

Awaiting Analysis

Vulnerability type

Category:

Server-Side Request Forgery

CWE:

CWE-918

Impact:

Information Disclosure

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.6)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

NVIDIA AIStore for Linux contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in its distributed sort component. An attacker who can supply a crafted external key map URL may cause the server to make unintended requests, potentially disclosing information accessible from the server's network position.

NVIDIA AIStore for Linux contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in its distributed sort component. An attacker who can supply a crafted external key map URL may cause the server to make unintended requests, potentially disclosing information accessible from the server's network position.

Affected context

The issue may arise in AIStore deployments that use the distributed sort component and accept externally supplied key map URLs. Risk increases when the server can reach internal services, protected network locations, or metadata endpoints that are not intended to be accessible through the application.

The issue may arise in AIStore deployments that use the distributed sort component and accept externally supplied key map URLs. Risk increases when the server can reach internal services, protected network locations, or metadata endpoints that are not intended to be accessible through the application.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: The distributed sort component's external key map URL handling
  • Required access: Ability to provide or influence a key map URL accepted by the service
  • Trigger point: Server-side processing of the supplied external URL
  • Why exploitation is possible: The server may initiate outbound requests based on attacker-controlled URL data without sufficiently restricting destinations or protocols
  • Attack surface: The distributed sort component's external key map URL handling
  • Required access: Ability to provide or influence a key map URL accepted by the service
  • Trigger point: Server-side processing of the supplied external URL
  • Why exploitation is possible: The server may initiate outbound requests based on attacker-controlled URL data without sufficiently restricting destinations or protocols

Why this happens

The vulnerability is associated with insufficient validation and destination control for externally supplied URLs.

When a server retrieves resources from an attacker-influenced location, it may be induced to access network resources that the attacker cannot reach directly. This behavior maps to CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery, particularly when URL allowlisting, network-boundary enforcement, or response handling controls are incomplete.

The vulnerability is associated with insufficient validation and destination control for externally supplied URLs.

When a server retrieves resources from an attacker-influenced location, it may be induced to access network resources that the attacker cannot reach directly. This behavior maps to CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery, particularly when URL allowlisting, network-boundary enforcement, or response handling controls are incomplete.

Potential impact

  • Sensitive information accessible to the AIStore server may be disclosed
  • Internal services could receive unintended requests
  • Network topology or service availability information may be exposed
  • Requests could potentially reach cloud or platform metadata services, depending on network permissions
  • Sensitive information accessible to the AIStore server may be disclosed
  • Internal services could receive unintended requests
  • Network topology or service availability information may be exposed
  • Requests could potentially reach cloud or platform metadata services, depending on network permissions

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on reducing trust in externally supplied URLs and constraining server-side network access.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Prefer predefined, trusted key map locations over arbitrary external URLs
  • Enforce strict URL parsing and destination allowlists
  • Restrict permitted schemes, ports, redirects, and address ranges
  • Block access to loopback, link-local, private, and reserved network destinations where not required
  • Apply egress filtering and network segmentation around AIStore services
  • Run the service with only the network and filesystem privileges it needs
  • Avoid returning fetched content or detailed connection errors unnecessarily

Mitigation generally focuses on reducing trust in externally supplied URLs and constraining server-side network access.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Prefer predefined, trusted key map locations over arbitrary external URLs
  • Enforce strict URL parsing and destination allowlists
  • Restrict permitted schemes, ports, redirects, and address ranges
  • Block access to loopback, link-local, private, and reserved network destinations where not required
  • Apply egress filtering and network segmentation around AIStore services
  • Run the service with only the network and filesystem privileges it needs
  • Avoid returning fetched content or detailed connection errors unnecessarily

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for SSRF risks through:

  • Static analysis and code review of URL-fetching, HTTP-client, and redirect-handling logic
  • Review signals involving attacker-controlled URLs passed to outbound request functions
  • Tests covering private, loopback, link-local, reserved, and metadata-service address ranges
  • Network monitoring for unexpected outbound connections from the distributed sort service
  • Egress policies that alert on or block unauthorized destinations and protocols

Automated security review tools may help identify URL validation gaps, but runtime network telemetry and policy enforcement provide important complementary coverage.

Organizations can look for SSRF risks through:

  • Static analysis and code review of URL-fetching, HTTP-client, and redirect-handling logic
  • Review signals involving attacker-controlled URLs passed to outbound request functions
  • Tests covering private, loopback, link-local, reserved, and metadata-service address ranges
  • Network monitoring for unexpected outbound connections from the distributed sort service
  • Egress policies that alert on or block unauthorized destinations and protocols

Automated security review tools may help identify URL validation gaps, but runtime network telemetry and policy enforcement provide important complementary coverage.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/NVIDIA/product-security/tree/main/2026/5889
nvd.nist.govnvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-65101
cve.orgcve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-65101

Frequently asked

questions

It may be exploitable through a service-accessible interface when an attacker can influence the external key map URL. The exact reachability depends on deployment exposure and access controls.

The attacker generally needs a way to submit or modify a key map URL processed by the distributed sort component. Authentication and authorization requirements depend on the AIStore deployment.

Accept only trusted resource locations where possible, validate URLs strictly, restrict destinations and protocols, and enforce outbound network controls.

Combine URL allowlisting with private-address blocking, redirect validation, least-privilege network access, egress filtering, and monitoring of server-initiated requests.

It may be exploitable through a service-accessible interface when an attacker can influence the external key map URL. The exact reachability depends on deployment exposure and access controls.

The attacker generally needs a way to submit or modify a key map URL processed by the distributed sort component. Authentication and authorization requirements depend on the AIStore deployment.

Accept only trusted resource locations where possible, validate URLs strictly, restrict destinations and protocols, and enforce outbound network controls.

Combine URL allowlisting with private-address blocking, redirect validation, least-privilege network access, egress filtering, and monitoring of server-initiated requests.

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