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CVE-2026-63343

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.9)

Path Traversal (CWE-73) in Incus Instance Metadata API

CVE-2026-63343

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Path Traversal

CWE:

CWE-73

Impact:

Host File Read/Write and Potential Container Escape

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.9)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A path traversal and unsafe symlink-handling vulnerability in Incus allows an authenticated user to use a malicious instance image to redirect metadata operations to arbitrary paths on the host.

Depending on permissions and the targeted file, this may allow reading or overwriting host files with root-level impact.

Affected context

The issue affects Incus deployments that process instance images containing a malicious metadata.yaml symlink and expose the instance metadata API to authenticated users. It becomes risky when metadata handling follows links without validating that the resolved path remains within the intended instance or image directory. The exposure depends on image import controls, user permissions, API availability, and host filesystem protections.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Incus instance metadata processing and its metadata API
  • Required access: An authenticated Incus account with sufficient permissions to use or deploy a crafted image
  • Trigger point: Metadata operations involving the metadata.yaml path
  • Required condition: The image contains a symlink that resolves outside the expected metadata directory
  • Why exploitation is possible: The affected path is not consistently confined or rejected before file access, allowing host paths to be treated as instance metadata

Why this happens

The underlying flaw is insufficient validation of symbolic links and resolved filesystem paths during metadata handling. A path supplied through an image can reference a location outside the intended trust boundary, and file operations may then follow that link with the privileges of the Incus service.

This maps to CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path, because attacker-influenced filesystem references are used without reliably enforcing confinement to an approved root. The insecure pattern is trusting a logical metadata path without validating its link target and canonical location before reading or writing.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may read sensitive files from the host
  • An attacker may overwrite host files or configuration
  • The Incus service may be abused to perform file operations with root privileges
  • Host integrity, availability, or confidentiality could be compromised
  • The issue could enable container escape or broader control of managed workloads

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing filesystem confinement and treating image contents as untrusted input.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Rejecting symbolic links for metadata paths unless their targets are explicitly approved
  • Resolving and validating canonical paths before every read or write operation
  • Confining file access to a dedicated root using operating-system-supported root handles or equivalent mechanisms
  • Applying the same validation consistently across metadata, template, and execution-related paths
  • Restricting which users can import images or create instances from untrusted images
  • Running management services with the minimum filesystem and host privileges necessary
  • Using read-only and integrity-protected host paths where practical

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for this vulnerability through:

  • Static analysis rules that flag file operations on attacker-controlled paths without symlink or root confinement checks
  • Code review signals such as direct path joins followed by open, copy, rename, or write operations
  • Tests that include symlinked metadata entries pointing inside and outside the permitted root
  • Policy checks requiring canonical-path validation or safe root-scoped file APIs
  • Runtime monitoring for unexpected Incus access to sensitive host paths
  • Audit review of image imports, instance creation, and metadata API activity by authenticated users

Automated security scanners and code-review tools may help identify unsafe path handling, but filesystem-boundary tests remain important for validating actual behavior.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/lxc/incus/security/advisories/GHSA-fmjx-5j3g-997p

Frequently asked

questions

Exploitation generally requires an authenticated Incus user who can introduce or deploy a malicious image and invoke the relevant instance metadata behavior. The practical scope depends on the user's assigned permissions.

It can be reachable through Incus management interfaces when an authenticated user has network access and sufficient authorization. It is not typically an unauthenticated attack.

Treat image contents as untrusted, reject or tightly control symbolic links, and enforce canonical path confinement before every metadata file operation.

Combine least-privilege Incus roles, controlled image provenance, filesystem sandboxing, symlink-focused tests, and code-review policies that require root-scoped file access.

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