Summary
SuiteCRM's REST API v4.1 get_entry_list method is vulnerable to time-based blind SQL injection under specific conditions. An authenticated caller who bypasses two independent security mechanisms may be able to infer and extract sensitive database information.
SuiteCRM's REST API v4.1 get_entry_list method is vulnerable to time-based blind SQL injection under specific conditions. An authenticated caller who bypasses two independent security mechanisms may be able to infer and extract sensitive database information.
Affected context
The vulnerability affects the REST API v4.1 get_entry_list method in SuiteCRM versions before 7.15.2 and 8.10.2. The advisory states that exploitation requires an authenticated caller to bypass two independent security mechanisms, but does not specify which controls are involved.
The vulnerability affects the REST API v4.1 get_entry_list method in SuiteCRM versions before 7.15.2 and 8.10.2. The advisory states that exploitation requires an authenticated caller to bypass two independent security mechanisms, but does not specify which controls are involved.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: SuiteCRM REST API v4.1, specifically
get_entry_list - Required access: An authenticated account, plus the ability to bypass two independent security mechanisms
- Trigger point: Processing a request through the affected method
- Why exploitation is possible: Under the stated conditions, input may influence SQL query behavior in a way that can be observed through response timing
- Control details: The advisory does not identify the two security mechanisms or explain how they are bypassed
- Attack surface: SuiteCRM REST API v4.1, specifically
get_entry_list - Required access: An authenticated account, plus the ability to bypass two independent security mechanisms
- Trigger point: Processing a request through the affected method
- Why exploitation is possible: Under the stated conditions, input may influence SQL query behavior in a way that can be observed through response timing
- Control details: The advisory does not identify the two security mechanisms or explain how they are bypassed
Why this happens
The issue is a SQL injection vulnerability mapped to CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command. It indicates that, under the required conditions, data handled by get_entry_list can affect SQL command interpretation rather than being treated solely as data. The advisory does not provide implementation details about the specific query or input handling pattern.
The issue is a SQL injection vulnerability mapped to CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command. It indicates that, under the required conditions, data handled by get_entry_list can affect SQL command interpretation rather than being treated solely as data. The advisory does not provide implementation details about the specific query or input handling pattern.
Potential impact
- An attacker may infer database contents through timing differences
- Sensitive information stored in the database could be exposed
- Confidentiality of CRM records may be reduced
- An attacker may infer database contents through timing differences
- Sensitive information stored in the database could be exposed
- Confidentiality of CRM records may be reduced
General mitigation guidance
Defensive approaches generally focus on keeping request data separate from SQL syntax and reducing the impact of any query-handling flaw.
- Use parameterized queries or equivalent database APIs that bind values rather than concatenate them into SQL statements
- Validate inputs against narrow, expected types and formats, without relying on validation as the sole SQL injection defense
- Apply authorization checks consistently and avoid security designs that depend on multiple controls being bypassed independently
- Limit database account privileges to only those needed by the application
- Avoid exposing detailed database errors or distinguishable timing behavior where practical
Defensive approaches generally focus on keeping request data separate from SQL syntax and reducing the impact of any query-handling flaw.
- Use parameterized queries or equivalent database APIs that bind values rather than concatenate them into SQL statements
- Validate inputs against narrow, expected types and formats, without relying on validation as the sole SQL injection defense
- Apply authorization checks consistently and avoid security designs that depend on multiple controls being bypassed independently
- Limit database account privileges to only those needed by the application
- Avoid exposing detailed database errors or distinguishable timing behavior where practical
How teams detect issues like this
- Use static analysis to identify SQL statements assembled through string concatenation or interpolation of request-derived values
- Review
get_entry_listand related API query paths for parameter binding, validation, and authorization enforcement - Monitor API and database telemetry for unusual request patterns, repeated timing probes, or unexpected query behavior
- Enforce secure query construction standards through code review policies and CI checks; automated review tools may help surface risky patterns
- Use static analysis to identify SQL statements assembled through string concatenation or interpolation of request-derived values
- Review
get_entry_listand related API query paths for parameter binding, validation, and authorization enforcement - Monitor API and database telemetry for unusual request patterns, repeated timing probes, or unexpected query behavior
- Enforce secure query construction standards through code review policies and CI checks; automated review tools may help surface risky patterns
