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CVE-2026-63177

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.1)

Authorization Bypass (CWE-863) in Malcolm OpenResty

CVE-2026-63177

Awaiting Analysis

Vulnerability type

Category:

Authorization Bypass

CWE:

CWE-863

Impact:

Unauthorized access to restricted backend resources

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

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Summary

Malcolm contains an authorization bypass in its Nginx OpenResty Lua access controls because the role check evaluates an unnormalized request URI while Nginx routes the normalized path. An authenticated low-privilege user may exploit this discrepancy to reach a backend resource that their role should not access.

Affected context

The issue can arise in Malcolm deployments that use the affected Nginx OpenResty Lua role-based access-control layer and route requests through normalized Nginx paths. Risk is higher when low-privilege authenticated users can send crafted path variations to endpoints protected by backend-specific authorization rules.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP request handling through the Malcolm web interface - Required access: An authenticated account with low privileges - Trigger point: Processing a request whose raw URI differs from the

normalized path used for routing

  • Why exploitation is possible: The Lua authorization decision may fail to

match a rule for the raw path, while Nginx maps the normalized path to a

restricted backend

Why this happens

The vulnerability results from inconsistent canonicalization between the authorization layer and the web server's routing layer. The Lua role check evaluates raw request data, whereas Nginx uses a normalized path, allowing security decisions and resource routing to be based on different representations. This maps to CWE-863, Incorrect Authorization, because the access-control decision can fail to enforce the intended restriction.

Potential impact

  • An authenticated user may access restricted backend endpoints
  • Sensitive network-analysis data or administrative functionality could be exposed
  • Unauthorized actions may be performed under a low-privilege account
  • Access-control boundaries between application components could be weakened

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on making routing and authorization use the same canonical request representation. Security controls should normalize paths before authorization, reject ambiguous or malformed path forms, and apply deny-by-default behavior when no rule matches. Backend authorization should be enforced independently of front-end path checks where practical, with narrowly scoped service privileges and minimized access for low-privilege roles. Input trust should be reduced by treating client-supplied path variations as untrusted and by centralizing canonicalization and policy evaluation.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection can include static analysis and code review for authorization logic that compares raw URI variables while routing or proxy layers canonicalize paths. Reviewers can look for path-based allowlists, fall-open behavior on unmatched rules, and inconsistent normalization across Nginx, OpenResty, and backend services. Runtime monitoring can flag unusual traversal-like path variants, authorization denials followed by successful backend responses, and low-privilege access to restricted routes. Automated security review tools may help identify mismatched canonicalization and authorization patterns.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/cisagov/CSAF/blob/develop/csaf_files/OT/white/2026/icsa-26-230-01.json
github.comgithub.com/cisagov/Malcolm/releases/tag/v26.07.0
github.comgithub.com/cisagov/Malcolm/security/advisories/GHSA-m5fr-rv3h-xg2r
cisa.govcisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-230-01

Frequently asked

questions

It may be exploitable through the Malcolm web interface when an attacker can

send HTTP requests to the affected routing layer.

The described scenario requires authentication with a low-privilege account.

Anonymous exploitation is not implied by the vulnerability description.

Ensure that routing and authorization operate on the same canonical path, reject

ambiguous representations, and use deny-by-default handling for unmatched

authorization rules.

Apply consistent canonicalization across proxies and applications, review

path-based access controls for fail-open behavior, and monitor for anomalous

requests that produce unexpected authorization outcomes.

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