Summary
A broken access control flaw in Omnispace Agora Project allows a space administrator to assign users to spaces outside the administrator's authorized scope. The issue becomes risky when the import flow creates space assignments without checking the caller's rights to the target space, potentially weakening tenant isolation.
A broken access control flaw in Omnispace Agora Project allows a space administrator to assign users to spaces outside the administrator's authorized scope. The issue becomes risky when the import flow creates space assignments without checking the caller's rights to the target space, potentially weakening tenant isolation.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in the spaceAffectList import flow, specifically when a join INSERT creates or updates a user-to-space assignment. It may be present when the flow does not verify the caller's read or equivalent authorization rights for the target space before applying the assignment.
The vulnerability occurs in the spaceAffectList import flow, specifically when a join INSERT creates or updates a user-to-space assignment. It may be present when the flow does not verify the caller's read or equivalent authorization rights for the target space before applying the assignment.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The spaceAffectList import and join INSERT functionality - Required access: A valid space administrator account or another identity
permitted to invoke the import flow
- Trigger point: Processing an assignment that references a target space outside the caller's authorized scope - Why exploitation is possible: The import path performs the affectation
without first enforcing the required readRight() authorization check
- Attack surface: The spaceAffectList import and join INSERT functionality - Required access: A valid space administrator account or another identity
permitted to invoke the import flow
- Trigger point: Processing an assignment that references a target space outside the caller's authorized scope - Why exploitation is possible: The import path performs the affectation
without first enforcing the required readRight() authorization check
Why this happens
The underlying bug is an authorization decision missing from a state-changing import operation. The application accepts a user-space assignment based on the submitted target space but does not verify that the caller is entitled to access or administer that space. This behavior maps to CWE-862, Missing Authorization, because a protected operation can proceed without an effective permission check at the point where access is granted.
The underlying bug is an authorization decision missing from a state-changing import operation. The application accepts a user-space assignment based on the submitted target space but does not verify that the caller is entitled to access or administer that space. This behavior maps to CWE-862, Missing Authorization, because a protected operation can proceed without an effective permission check at the point where access is granted.
Potential impact
- An attacker may assign users to unauthorized spaces.
- Tenant boundaries could be weakened or bypassed.
- Unauthorized users could gain access to space-scoped data or functions.
- Administrative records and user-space memberships could be manipulated.
- Cross-tenant exposure or operational disruption could occur.
- An attacker may assign users to unauthorized spaces.
- Tenant boundaries could be weakened or bypassed.
- Unauthorized users could gain access to space-scoped data or functions.
- Administrative records and user-space memberships could be manipulated.
- Cross-tenant exposure or operational disruption could occur.
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally centers on enforcing authorization at every state-changing assignment boundary. The import flow should validate the caller's rights against the specific target space before creating or changing memberships, rather than relying on earlier UI or workflow checks. Secure defaults should deny assignments when the target space or caller scope cannot be resolved, and authorization should be based on server-side identity and tenant context rather than submitted identifiers. Least-privilege roles, consistent policy enforcement across create and update paths, and audit logging for cross-scope assignment attempts can further reduce exposure.
Mitigation generally centers on enforcing authorization at every state-changing assignment boundary. The import flow should validate the caller's rights against the specific target space before creating or changing memberships, rather than relying on earlier UI or workflow checks. Secure defaults should deny assignments when the target space or caller scope cannot be resolved, and authorization should be based on server-side identity and tenant context rather than submitted identifiers. Least-privilege roles, consistent policy enforcement across create and update paths, and audit logging for cross-scope assignment attempts can further reduce exposure.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection can include static analysis and code review checks for database inserts or updates involving memberships that lack a nearby authorization decision. Reviewers can look for imported tenant or space identifiers being trusted directly, authorization checks implemented only in client code, and inconsistent enforcement between interactive and bulk-import paths. Runtime monitoring can flag assignments where the caller's tenant or administrative scope differs from the target space, while policy tests can verify deny-by- default behavior for cross-scope operations. Automated security review tools may help identify missing authorization checks, but findings should be validated against the application's permission model.
Detection can include static analysis and code review checks for database inserts or updates involving memberships that lack a nearby authorization decision. Reviewers can look for imported tenant or space identifiers being trusted directly, authorization checks implemented only in client code, and inconsistent enforcement between interactive and bulk-import paths. Runtime monitoring can flag assignments where the caller's tenant or administrative scope differs from the target space, while policy tests can verify deny-by- default behavior for cross-scope operations. Automated security review tools may help identify missing authorization checks, but findings should be validated against the application's permission model.
Sources
| Source | Link |
|---|---|
| github. | github.com/ |
| agora-project. | agora-project.net/ |
| vulncheck. | vulncheck.com/ |
