Summary
Omnispace Agora Project may allow a regular, non-administrative member to create user accounts through a user-edit action that does not enforce the required authorization check. If an attacker can invoke this action, the resulting unauthorized accounts could support privilege escalation or broader unauthorized access.
Omnispace Agora Project may allow a regular, non-administrative member to create user accounts through a user-edit action that does not enforce the required authorization check. If an attacker can invoke this action, the resulting unauthorized accounts could support privilege escalation or broader unauthorized access.
Affected context
The issue may occur in Omnispace Agora Project deployments where the user editing action is reachable by authenticated members and function-level authorization is not enforced before account creation is processed. The affected behavior is associated with the actionVueEditUser workflow and the missing editRight() check.
The issue may occur in Omnispace Agora Project deployments where the user editing action is reachable by authenticated members and function-level authorization is not enforced before account creation is processed. The affected behavior is associated with the actionVueEditUser workflow and the missing editRight() check.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The user-management action exposed by the application - Required access: An authenticated regular member account - Trigger point: Invocation of the actionVueEditUser user-edit operation - Why exploitation is possible: The operation may process account creation
without verifying the caller's required administrative edit permission
- Attack surface: The user-management action exposed by the application - Required access: An authenticated regular member account - Trigger point: Invocation of the actionVueEditUser user-edit operation - Why exploitation is possible: The operation may process account creation
without verifying the caller's required administrative edit permission
Why this happens
The vulnerability results from a missing function-level authorization check in a user-management operation. The application permits the action to proceed without enforcing the editRight() decision, allowing a lower- privilege principal to perform an administrative function. This behavior maps to CWE-862, Missing Authorization, where access control enforcement is absent for a protected operation.
The vulnerability results from a missing function-level authorization check in a user-management operation. The application permits the action to proceed without enforcing the editRight() decision, allowing a lower- privilege principal to perform an administrative function. This behavior maps to CWE-862, Missing Authorization, where access control enforcement is absent for a protected operation.
Potential impact
- An attacker may create unauthorized user accounts.
- Newly created accounts could receive inappropriate privileges.
- Attackers could gain broader access to application functionality or data.
- The application may experience account-management abuse or administrative
control erosion.
- An attacker may create unauthorized user accounts.
- Newly created accounts could receive inappropriate privileges.
- Attackers could gain broader access to application functionality or data.
- The application may experience account-management abuse or administrative
control erosion.
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally centers on enforcing authorization at the server-side function boundary for every user-management operation. Secure-by-default patterns include requiring explicit administrative permissions for account creation, deriving authorization from trusted server-side identity and role data, and applying the same policy consistently across alternate action routes. Input trust should be reduced by treating client-provided action names, roles, and permission indicators as untrusted. Least privilege, centralized policy enforcement, and audit logging can further limit the consequences of authorization mistakes.
Mitigation generally centers on enforcing authorization at the server-side function boundary for every user-management operation. Secure-by-default patterns include requiring explicit administrative permissions for account creation, deriving authorization from trusted server-side identity and role data, and applying the same policy consistently across alternate action routes. Input trust should be reduced by treating client-provided action names, roles, and permission indicators as untrusted. Least privilege, centralized policy enforcement, and audit logging can further limit the consequences of authorization mistakes.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection approaches may include static analysis for sensitive controller or action methods that lack authorization guards, code review checks for permission enforcement before account mutations, and policy rules requiring centralized authorization on user-management endpoints. Runtime monitoring can look for account creation by non-administrative principals, unusual bursts of user creation, and mismatches between requested operations and effective permissions. Automated security review tools may help identify missing access-control checks.
Detection approaches may include static analysis for sensitive controller or action methods that lack authorization guards, code review checks for permission enforcement before account mutations, and policy rules requiring centralized authorization on user-management endpoints. Runtime monitoring can look for account creation by non-administrative principals, unusual bursts of user creation, and mismatches between requested operations and effective permissions. Automated security review tools may help identify missing access-control checks.
Sources
| Source | Link |
|---|---|
| github. | github.com/ |
| agora-project. | agora-project.net/ |
| vulncheck. | vulncheck.com/ |
