Summary
Omnispace Agora Project contains a path traversal vulnerability in handling the temporary upload directory name. An attacker who can influence the tmpFolderName value may cause uploaded or generated files to be written outside the intended temporary directory, potentially enabling remote code execution when a writable target such as the web root is reached.
Omnispace Agora Project contains a path traversal vulnerability in handling the temporary upload directory name. An attacker who can influence the tmpFolderName value may cause uploaded or generated files to be written outside the intended temporary directory, potentially enabling remote code execution when a writable target such as the web root is reached.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in upload workflows that construct destination paths from an unanchored tmpFolderName value. It becomes risky when attacker-controlled or insufficiently validated input is incorporated into filesystem paths without ensuring that the resolved path remains within the designated temporary directory.
The vulnerability occurs in upload workflows that construct destination paths from an unanchored tmpFolderName value. It becomes risky when attacker-controlled or insufficiently validated input is incorporated into filesystem paths without ensuring that the resolved path remains within the designated temporary directory.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: File upload or temporary-file creation functionality
- Required access: Ability to submit or influence a request containing the temporary folder name
- Trigger point: Server-side construction of the upload destination path
- Why exploitation is possible: Traversal sequences can cause path resolution to escape the intended directory and target attacker-selected writable locations
- Additional condition: Impact is greater when the application process can write to executable or web-served directories
- Attack surface: File upload or temporary-file creation functionality
- Required access: Ability to submit or influence a request containing the temporary folder name
- Trigger point: Server-side construction of the upload destination path
- Why exploitation is possible: Traversal sequences can cause path resolution to escape the intended directory and target attacker-selected writable locations
- Additional condition: Impact is greater when the application process can write to executable or web-served directories
Why this happens
The underlying bug is improper neutralization of path elements supplied through the tmpFolderName value. The application uses an unanchored path component when constructing a filesystem destination, allowing traversal sequences to alter the resolved path. This maps to CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory, commonly known as path traversal.
The underlying bug is improper neutralization of path elements supplied through the tmpFolderName value. The application uses an unanchored path component when constructing a filesystem destination, allowing traversal sequences to alter the resolved path. This maps to CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory, commonly known as path traversal.
Potential impact
- Attackers may write arbitrary files outside the intended temporary directory
- The application or web server could serve attacker-controlled content
- Server-side code execution may occur if executable content reaches an appropriate location
- Application data or configuration files could be overwritten
- The host may be used for further compromise or lateral movement
- Attackers may write arbitrary files outside the intended temporary directory
- The application or web server could serve attacker-controlled content
- Server-side code execution may occur if executable content reaches an appropriate location
- Application data or configuration files could be overwritten
- The host may be used for further compromise or lateral movement
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on treating upload path components as untrusted data and enforcing a strict directory boundary.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Generate server-side temporary names rather than accepting directory names from clients
- Resolve candidate paths and verify that they remain beneath an approved base directory
- Reject traversal markers, absolute paths, encoded separators, and unexpected path syntax
- Store uploads outside web-served and executable directories where possible
- Apply allowlisted filename and directory formats instead of attempting to normalize arbitrary input
- Run the application with only the filesystem permissions required for its function
- Use non-executable mounts and isolated storage for uploaded content
Mitigation generally focuses on treating upload path components as untrusted data and enforcing a strict directory boundary.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Generate server-side temporary names rather than accepting directory names from clients
- Resolve candidate paths and verify that they remain beneath an approved base directory
- Reject traversal markers, absolute paths, encoded separators, and unexpected path syntax
- Store uploads outside web-served and executable directories where possible
- Apply allowlisted filename and directory formats instead of attempting to normalize arbitrary input
- Run the application with only the filesystem permissions required for its function
- Use non-executable mounts and isolated storage for uploaded content
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can detect path traversal risks through:
- Static analysis rules for filesystem APIs that concatenate user input into paths
- Code review checks for missing canonicalization and base-directory validation
- Tests using encoded separators, absolute paths, and traversal sequences
- Runtime monitoring for writes outside approved upload and temporary directories
- Web application policies that restrict upload destinations and reject unexpected path components
- Automated security scanning and code review tools configured to identify CWE-22 patterns
Organizations can detect path traversal risks through:
- Static analysis rules for filesystem APIs that concatenate user input into paths
- Code review checks for missing canonicalization and base-directory validation
- Tests using encoded separators, absolute paths, and traversal sequences
- Runtime monitoring for writes outside approved upload and temporary directories
- Web application policies that restrict upload destinations and reject unexpected path components
- Automated security scanning and code review tools configured to identify CWE-22 patterns
Sources
| Source | Link |
|---|---|
| github. | github.com/ |
| agora-project. | agora-project.net/ |
| vulncheck. | vulncheck.com/ |
