Summary
Omnispace Agora releases before 26.10.0 may store persistent remember-me tokens in plaintext, making the server-side value identical to the bearer credential in a user's cookie. If an attacker obtains the stored token through database, backup, or similar disclosure, they may replay it to authenticate as the affected user without knowing the user's password.
Omnispace Agora releases before 26.10.0 may store persistent remember-me tokens in plaintext, making the server-side value identical to the bearer credential in a user's cookie. If an attacker obtains the stored token through database, backup, or similar disclosure, they may replay it to authenticate as the affected user without knowing the user's password.
Affected context
The issue can arise in Omnispace Agora deployments that persist remember-me credentials in a form that is directly usable for authentication. It is most concerning where application databases, backups, logs, or administrative data stores may be disclosed, and where persistent sessions remain valid after such exposure.
The issue can arise in Omnispace Agora deployments that persist remember-me credentials in a form that is directly usable for authentication. It is most concerning where application databases, backups, logs, or administrative data stores may be disclosed, and where persistent sessions remain valid after such exposure.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Persistent authentication-token storage and session validation
- Required access: Access to a database, backup, administrative export, or other location containing the stored token
- Trigger point: Replay of the recovered token through the remember-me authentication flow
- Why exploitation is possible: The stored value functions as a bearer credential, so possession may be sufficient for authentication without the victim's password
- Attack surface: Persistent authentication-token storage and session validation
- Required access: Access to a database, backup, administrative export, or other location containing the stored token
- Trigger point: Replay of the recovered token through the remember-me authentication flow
- Why exploitation is possible: The stored value functions as a bearer credential, so possession may be sufficient for authentication without the victim's password
Why this happens
The underlying flaw is storing a persistent authentication token in a directly reusable form rather than protecting it as a verifier. This creates a one-to-one relationship between a disclosed server-side value and the credential accepted by the authentication mechanism. The behavior maps to CWE-522, Insufficiently Protected Credentials, because sensitive authentication material is not adequately protected against storage disclosure.
The underlying flaw is storing a persistent authentication token in a directly reusable form rather than protecting it as a verifier. This creates a one-to-one relationship between a disclosed server-side value and the credential accepted by the authentication mechanism. The behavior maps to CWE-522, Insufficiently Protected Credentials, because sensitive authentication material is not adequately protected against storage disclosure.
Potential impact
- An attacker could authenticate as an affected user
- User accounts could be taken over without password knowledge
- Private application data could be accessed or modified
- Administrative or privileged accounts could be compromised if their tokens are exposed
- Persistent sessions could remain usable until tokens are revoked or expire
- An attacker could authenticate as an affected user
- User accounts could be taken over without password knowledge
- Private application data could be accessed or modified
- Administrative or privileged accounts could be compromised if their tokens are exposed
- Persistent sessions could remain usable until tokens are revoked or expire
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on ensuring that persistent credentials are not stored in directly replayable form. Common defensive patterns include storing only a strong, one-way representation of tokens and comparing presented values through an appropriate verification process. Tokens can be scoped to the intended session, rotated on use or security events, expired after a bounded period, and revocable independently of passwords. Database and backup access should follow least-privilege principles, sensitive values should be excluded from logs and exports, and authentication should fail safely when token integrity or lifecycle metadata cannot be verified.
Mitigation generally focuses on ensuring that persistent credentials are not stored in directly replayable form. Common defensive patterns include storing only a strong, one-way representation of tokens and comparing presented values through an appropriate verification process. Tokens can be scoped to the intended session, rotated on use or security events, expired after a bounded period, and revocable independently of passwords. Database and backup access should follow least-privilege principles, sensitive values should be excluded from logs and exports, and authentication should fail safely when token integrity or lifecycle metadata cannot be verified.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection can include static analysis and code review searches for authentication tokens written directly to database fields, logs, backups, or administrative exports, as well as validation paths that compare stored token values directly with cookie contents. Reviewers can inspect token generation, storage, rotation, expiration, and revocation behavior. Database and backup monitoring policies can also flag plaintext bearer-like values in credential-related tables. Automated security review tools may help identify direct persistence or logging of sensitive authentication material.
Detection can include static analysis and code review searches for authentication tokens written directly to database fields, logs, backups, or administrative exports, as well as validation paths that compare stored token values directly with cookie contents. Reviewers can inspect token generation, storage, rotation, expiration, and revocation behavior. Database and backup monitoring policies can also flag plaintext bearer-like values in credential-related tables. Automated security review tools may help identify direct persistence or logging of sensitive authentication material.
Sources
| Source | Link |
|---|---|
| github. | github.com/ |
| agora-project. | agora-project.net/ |
| vulncheck. | vulncheck.com/ |
