Summary
Omnispace Agora can mishandle caller-controlled field names during user imports, allowing SQL identifier injection through the agoraFields[] input.
A space administrator who can influence the import request may alter administrative column handling and escalate privileges to general administrator access.
Omnispace Agora can mishandle caller-controlled field names during user imports, allowing SQL identifier injection through the agoraFields[] input.
A space administrator who can influence the import request may alter administrative column handling and escalate privileges to general administrator access.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in the Omnispace Agora user import flow when values supplied through agoraFields[] are used as SQL column identifiers without adequate validation or allowlisting. It is most relevant where a space administrator can submit or control import parameters and the resulting query can update privileged account attributes.
The vulnerability occurs in the Omnispace Agora user import flow when values supplied through agoraFields[] are used as SQL column identifiers without adequate validation or allowlisting. It is most relevant where a space administrator can submit or control import parameters and the resulting query can update privileged account attributes.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: User import functionality in the Agora application
- Required access: Authenticated access sufficient to act as a space administrator
- Attacker control: Ability to supply or influence
agoraFields[]names - Trigger point: SQL query construction during user import processing
- Why exploitation is possible: Caller-controlled identifiers are incorporated into SQL statements without reliably restricting them to approved column names
- Attack surface: User import functionality in the Agora application
- Required access: Authenticated access sufficient to act as a space administrator
- Attacker control: Ability to supply or influence
agoraFields[]names - Trigger point: SQL query construction during user import processing
- Why exploitation is possible: Caller-controlled identifiers are incorporated into SQL statements without reliably restricting them to approved column names
Why this happens
The underlying bug is SQL identifier injection, a form of CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command. The application treats externally supplied field names as trusted SQL column identifiers instead of mapping them to a fixed internal set of allowed fields. As a result, attacker-controlled names or identifier syntax can influence which columns are referenced or modified, including fields associated with administrative privileges.
The underlying bug is SQL identifier injection, a form of CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command. The application treats externally supplied field names as trusted SQL column identifiers instead of mapping them to a fixed internal set of allowed fields. As a result, attacker-controlled names or identifier syntax can influence which columns are referenced or modified, including fields associated with administrative privileges.
Potential impact
- Escalation from space administrator to general administrator privileges
- Unauthorized modification of administrative account flags
- Expanded access to spaces, users, or application functionality
- Increased risk of further data access or administrative abuse
- Escalation from space administrator to general administrator privileges
- Unauthorized modification of administrative account flags
- Expanded access to spaces, users, or application functionality
- Increased risk of further data access or administrative abuse
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on separating user-controlled field names from SQL query structure.
Defensive patterns include:
- Mapping external field names to a strict allowlist of internal column identifiers
- Rejecting unknown, duplicated, malformed, or reserved field names
- Avoiding direct concatenation of caller-controlled identifiers into SQL statements
- Using parameterized queries for values and narrowly scoped query builders for approved identifiers
- Enforcing server-side authorization checks before applying administrative attribute changes
- Applying least privilege to database accounts and limiting which roles can modify privileged fields
- Treating imported administrative flags as protected attributes requiring explicit policy enforcement
Mitigation generally focuses on separating user-controlled field names from SQL query structure.
Defensive patterns include:
- Mapping external field names to a strict allowlist of internal column identifiers
- Rejecting unknown, duplicated, malformed, or reserved field names
- Avoiding direct concatenation of caller-controlled identifiers into SQL statements
- Using parameterized queries for values and narrowly scoped query builders for approved identifiers
- Enforcing server-side authorization checks before applying administrative attribute changes
- Applying least privilege to database accounts and limiting which roles can modify privileged fields
- Treating imported administrative flags as protected attributes requiring explicit policy enforcement
How teams detect issues like this
Detection can combine static analysis, code review, and runtime controls:
- Search for SQL construction that concatenates request-derived field names or identifiers
- Review import handlers for missing allowlists and authorization checks around privileged columns
- Use taint analysis to trace
agoraFields[]or equivalent inputs into query-generation APIs - Monitor imports for unexpected identifiers, reserved administrative fields, or unusual privilege changes
- Enforce application policies that restrict which roles may submit field mappings or alter administrative attributes
- Use automated security review tools to flag dynamic SQL identifier construction
Detection can combine static analysis, code review, and runtime controls:
- Search for SQL construction that concatenates request-derived field names or identifiers
- Review import handlers for missing allowlists and authorization checks around privileged columns
- Use taint analysis to trace
agoraFields[]or equivalent inputs into query-generation APIs - Monitor imports for unexpected identifiers, reserved administrative fields, or unusual privilege changes
- Enforce application policies that restrict which roles may submit field mappings or alter administrative attributes
- Use automated security review tools to flag dynamic SQL identifier construction
Sources
| Source | Link |
|---|---|
| github. | github.com/ |
| agora-project. | agora-project.net/ |
| vulncheck. | vulncheck.com/ |
