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CVE-2026-62988

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.0)

Sensitive Data Exposure (CWE-200) in Froxlor API Commands

CVE-2026-62988

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Sensitive Data Exposure

CWE:

CWE-200

Impact:

Credential Disclosure and Account Takeover

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.0)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Froxlor API commands expose complete database records, including password hashes and Base32-encoded TOTP secrets, instead of filtering sensitive authentication fields. An authenticated caller authorized to use the affected customer, administrator, or FTP endpoints may use this information for offline password cracking and generation of valid second-factor codes.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in Froxlor API commands that retrieve customer, administrator, and FTP records from the database. Deployments may be at risk when authenticated API users are granted access to the affected get or listing endpoints and the API response includes password or two-factor authentication fields that should remain server-side.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Authenticated Froxlor API endpoints for customer, administrator, and FTP records
  • Required access: An account or integration with permission to invoke the affected API commands
  • Trigger point: A get or listing request that returns database-backed account records
  • Why exploitation is possible: The API returns password hashes and TOTP seed data without applying sensitive-field filtering before serialization

Why this happens

The underlying issue is excessive disclosure of sensitive database attributes through an API response. The affected commands retrieve full rows and return authentication-related fields, including password hashes and two-factor secrets, rather than projecting only the data required by the caller. This behavior maps to CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor, because an otherwise authorized API user can receive secrets outside the intended data scope.

Potential impact

  • Password hashes could be cracked offline
  • TOTP seeds could be used to generate valid second-factor codes
  • Attackers could take over customer, administrator, or FTP accounts
  • Combined credential exposure could defeat both authentication factors
  • Hosted resources and the Froxlor management panel could be compromised
  • Exposed secrets could support persistence or lateral movement

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on minimizing data returned by authenticated APIs and treating authentication material as server-side secrets.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Use explicit response schemas or field allowlists instead of serializing complete database rows
  • Exclude password hashes, TOTP seeds, recovery data, and other authentication secrets from general-purpose endpoints
  • Apply endpoint-specific authorization and least-privilege policies
  • Separate administrative secret-management operations from ordinary record retrieval
  • Require deliberate reauthentication and narrowly scoped permissions for sensitive security operations
  • Rotate or reset exposed passwords and two-factor secrets when disclosure is suspected
  • Log and review access to account-management and credential-related API endpoints

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can assess this issue through:

  • Static analysis for direct serialization of database rows into API responses
  • Code review checks requiring explicit response field selection
  • API contract tests that verify password, TOTP, and other secret fields are absent
  • Schema and policy rules preventing authentication attributes from appearing in ordinary resources
  • Runtime monitoring for unusual access to customer, administrator, or FTP listing endpoints
  • Review of historical API responses and access logs for sensitive-field exposure

Automated API security testing and code review tools may help identify responses that contain credential or second-factor material.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/froxlor/froxlor/commit/52a43fb826bb9a058faf9c39feeef7ac4444ceba
github.comgithub.com/froxlor/froxlor/commit/8667fa3a4d77d6e322b7b8f7b9edbc1613ab5797
github.comgithub.com/froxlor/froxlor/releases/tag/2.3.8
github.comgithub.com/froxlor/froxlor/security/advisories/GHSA-7788-ghfq-c6mh

Frequently asked

questions

Exploitation generally requires an authenticated API caller with permission to use one or more affected get or listing commands. The caller does not necessarily need full administrator privileges if delegated endpoint access is available.

Responses may include customer, administrator, and FTP password hashes, along with Base32-encoded TOTP seeds for applicable accounts.

Return only explicitly approved fields for each API operation and keep password hashes and two-factor secrets out of normal retrieval and listing responses.

Use least-privilege API permissions, enforce response schemas, test that secrets never appear in API output, monitor sensitive endpoint access, and rotate credentials or second-factor secrets after suspected exposure.

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