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CVE-2026-62960

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.4)

UNC Path Disclosure (CWE-200) in Git for Windows Client

CVE-2026-62960

Awaiting Analysis

Vulnerability type

Category:

Information Disclosure

CWE:

CWE-200, CWE-610

Impact:

NTLM Authentication Material Disclosure

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.4)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Git for Windows can process a malicious bundle URI advertised by a remote Git server as a local Windows path when bundle URI support is enabled. During clone or fetch, this behavior may cause an outbound SMB connection to an attacker-controlled host, exposing NTLM authentication material.

Affected context

The issue can occur in Git for Windows installations that enable bundle URI handling through transfer.bundleuri=true and connect to a malicious or compromised Git server. The risk arises when non-HTTP(S) bundle locations are interpreted as local filesystem paths and Windows-specific UNC or file URI references are processed during clone or fetch.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Git clone or fetch operations involving a remote server
  • Required access: The attacker must control or influence the remote Git server's advertised bundle URI
  • Trigger point: Bundle URI retrieval through the Git transport and file-copy handling paths
  • Why exploitation is possible: Non-HTTP(S) values may be treated as filesystem locations, allowing a remote-controlled path to initiate an outbound SMB connection

Why this happens

The underlying bug is insufficient validation and trust-boundary enforcement for remotely advertised bundle URI values on Windows. URI handling removes file URI prefixes and permits path forms that can reference network shares, causing a client-side network authentication attempt to an attacker-selected host. This behavior maps primarily to CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor, with CWE-610: Externally Controlled Reference to an Object describing the use of attacker-influenced references.

Potential impact

  • NTLM authentication material may be exposed to an attacker-controlled host
  • An attacker could attempt offline analysis or relay of captured authentication data
  • User or service account identities may be disclosed through outbound authentication
  • Organizational network location and trust relationships could be revealed
  • Repeated exposure could increase the risk of broader credential compromise

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on treating all server-advertised bundle locations as untrusted data and preventing them from initiating unintended network authentication.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Restricting bundle URI handling to explicitly supported, authenticated transport schemes
  • Rejecting UNC paths, local filesystem references, and ambiguous file URI forms from remote metadata
  • Applying strict canonicalization and allowlisting before any path or transport operation
  • Disabling optional bundle retrieval where it is not required by operational workflows
  • Limiting outbound SMB traffic from developer workstations and build environments
  • Running Git operations with least-privileged accounts and minimizing credential exposure
  • Using network policies that prevent unnecessary authentication to untrusted hosts

How teams detect issues like this

Detection can combine source analysis, runtime telemetry, and policy enforcement:

  • Use static analysis to identify remote metadata flowing into filesystem, UNC, or network-share APIs
  • Review code for scheme allowlisting, path canonicalization, and validation performed before transport selection
  • Monitor Git clients for unexpected outbound SMB connections during clone or fetch activity
  • Alert on NTLM authentication attempts to external, untrusted, or newly observed hosts
  • Enforce endpoint and network policies that restrict SMB egress and unsolicited credential negotiation
  • Add automated security review rules for externally controlled URI values reaching file or network operations

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/git-for-windows/git/commit/a93524749d7806870fd2b4b00a3812da1d6e5f4a
github.comgithub.com/git-for-windows/git/releases/tag/v2.55.0.windows.4
github.comgithub.com/git-for-windows/git/security/advisories/GHSA-xrpg-8j9v-v282

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, within the relevant interaction model. A malicious or compromised Git server can advertise a crafted bundle URI, but a victim client must perform a clone or fetch operation under conditions where bundle URI handling is enabled.

No direct local access is generally required. The attacker needs control of, or influence over, the Git server or repository endpoint contacted by the victim.

Treat remote bundle locations as untrusted, allow only explicitly approved transport schemes, and reject UNC or local filesystem references before any network or file operation occurs.

Combine strict URI validation with outbound SMB restrictions, least-privilege execution, endpoint monitoring, and code review rules that track externally controlled values into filesystem or network APIs.

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