Summary
A critical authorization bypass in Incus can allow dangerous instance configuration from a source project to bypass restrictions enforced by the target project during cross-project copies. An attacker with permission to copy an instance between projects may be able to introduce privileged or low-level runtime settings that the target project is intended to prohibit.
Affected context
The issue affects Incus deployments that support copying instances across projects and rely on project-level restrictions for instance creation. It becomes risky when the source instance contains configuration keys such as security.privileged, raw.lxc, or raw.apparmor, and those settings are merged into the copy request after the target project's authorization check has already completed.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Incus instance-copy operations spanning projects
- Required access: Permission to initiate a copy and access a suitable source instance
- Trigger point: Authorization and configuration processing during the cross-project copy workflow
- Why exploitation is possible: The target project's creation restrictions are evaluated before source configuration is merged, so prohibited settings can enter the request after the relevant check
Why this happens
The underlying defect is an order-of-operations failure in authorization enforcement. Incus evaluates whether the target project permits instance creation before incorporating configuration inherited from the source instance. Because security-sensitive settings are added after the decision, the authorization check does not cover the complete effective request. This behavior maps to CWE-863, Incorrect Authorization, because controls are applied to an incomplete representation of the operation and can therefore be bypassed.
Potential impact
- An attacker may create instances with security-sensitive settings prohibited by the target project.
- Project-level isolation controls could be weakened or bypassed.
- A copied instance could receive privileged container behavior or altered LXC and AppArmor handling.
- Host resources, neighboring workloads, or sensitive data could be exposed depending on the resulting configuration and deployment permissions.
- Administrative policy enforcement across projects could be undermined.
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on authorizing the final, fully merged operation
rather than an incomplete request.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Re-evaluating all project restrictions after inherited and user-supplied configuration has been merged.
- Treating security-sensitive configuration keys as untrusted across project boundaries.
- Maintaining explicit allowlists for settings that may cross project boundaries.
- Applying deny-by-default handling for privileged, raw runtime, and security-policy configuration.
- Limiting cross-project copy permissions according to least privilege.
- Separating administrative projects and restricting who can create or move instances into them.
- Auditing existing instances and project policies for configurations that violate intended restrictions.
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for this class of issue through:
- Code review of authorization paths that validate requests before normalization, inheritance, or configuration merging.
- Static analysis and query rules identifying security checks that precede object composition or policy-relevant field population.
- Tests that attempt prohibited configuration combinations through copy, clone, import, restore, and migration workflows.
- Policy enforcement that validates the final effective instance configuration at the target project boundary.
- Audit-log analysis for cross-project operations followed by creation of privileged or raw-configured instances.
Automated security review tools may help identify inconsistent validation order, but runtime policy tests remain important for authorization logic.

