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CVE-2026-62677

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

Path Traversal (CWE-22) in Omnigent Agent Runner

CVE-2026-62677

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Path Traversal

CWE:

CWE-22

Impact:

Unauthorized file access and command execution

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Omnigent contains a path traversal vulnerability in session-scoped agent bundles, where an authenticated user can supply an absolute or traversal-containing working-directory value. On affected runners, this may let agent tools read, modify, or execute commands against files and environment secrets outside the intended workspace.

Affected context

The issue occurs in Omnigent runner environments that accept user-controlled agent bundles and do not constrain the os_env.cwd value to an approved workspace. Risk is higher when OMNIGENT_RUNNER_WORKSPACE is unset, because the supplied path may become the trusted environment root used by file and shell tools.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Authenticated agent-bundle upload or session creation
  • Required access: A valid account with permission to upload or configure a session-scoped agent bundle
  • Trigger point: Runner initialization and subsequent use of file or shell tools
  • Why exploitation is possible: The working-directory value is preserved without confinement, and later boundary checks trust the attacker-selected path as the workspace root

Why this happens

The vulnerability results from inadequate canonicalization and validation of a user-controlled filesystem path. Omnigent stores os_env.cwd verbatim, permits absolute or traversal-containing values, and may use the resolved path as both the environment root and copy source. This maps to CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory, because filesystem operations intended to remain within a workspace can be redirected outside that directory.

Potential impact

  • Sensitive files and environment secrets could be disclosed
  • Runner files could be overwritten or deleted
  • Shell tools could execute commands in an unintended directory
  • Agent sessions could affect other tenants or workloads, depending on runner privileges
  • Compromised runner credentials could enable further lateral movement

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing the workspace boundary independently of user-provided paths.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Resolve and canonicalize paths before authorization checks
  • Reject absolute paths and traversal components in untrusted working-directory values
  • Bind agent sessions to a server-selected, per-session workspace
  • Verify that every resolved path remains beneath an immutable trusted root
  • Avoid using attacker-controlled paths as both validation roots and operation targets
  • Run runners with least-privilege identities and minimal filesystem and secret access
  • Keep sensitive credentials outside directories reachable by agent tools

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for:

  • Static analysis rules identifying unsanitized path values passed to chdir, copytree, file APIs, or shell environments
  • Code review signals where user-controlled paths define validation roots or filesystem boundaries
  • Tests covering absolute paths, parent-directory traversal, symlinks, and path canonicalization
  • Runtime policy enforcement that restricts runner filesystem access to per-session workspaces
  • Audit events for agent bundles containing suspicious working-directory values or access outside approved roots

Automated security review tools may help identify path-flow and boundary-validation weaknesses during development.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/commit/7ca0cca3c9a65c04c489edf68f0e080424a26868
github.comgithub.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/pull/1417
github.comgithub.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/releases/tag/v0.3.0
github.comgithub.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/security/advisories/GHSA-p8rw-8qj3-hf33

Frequently asked

questions

An attacker generally needs authenticated access that permits uploading or configuring a session-scoped agent bundle.

The described path-confusion behavior is especially exposed when OMNIGENT_RUNNER_WORKSPACE is unset, but deployments should not rely solely on that setting for filesystem isolation.

Use a server-controlled workspace, canonicalize candidate paths, and enforce that every resolved operation remains beneath the trusted workspace root.

Treat all agent-provided paths as untrusted, apply centralized path-boundary checks, test traversal and symlink cases, and minimize the runner's filesystem and credential privileges.

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