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CVE-2026-62420

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.9)

Authorization Bypass (CWE-863) in LXD Instance Move

CVE-2026-62420

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Authorization Bypass

CWE:

CWE-863

Impact:

Unauthorized Cross-Project Resource Introduction

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.9)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A critical authorization bypass in LXD allows an authenticated attacker to evade project security restrictions during cross-project instance migrations. When the migration is directed to another cluster member, the destination may treat the request as trusted internal traffic and accept instance configurations that the target project should prohibit.

Affected context

This issue may occur in LXD clusters that permit authenticated users to initiate cross-project instance migrations. The risk is present when a migration request identifies both a target project and a different cluster member, while the destination node processes the request as an internal cluster notification and therefore does not repeat the applicable project restriction checks.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: LXD's authenticated instance migration API
  • Required access: Authenticated permission to initiate or otherwise control an instance migration
  • Trigger point: A cross-project migration directed to a different cluster member
  • Why exploitation is possible: The destination node may trust the migration as an internal notification and omit authorization checks that should enforce restrictions for the target project

Why this happens

The underlying flaw is an authorization boundary failure in distributed request handling. LXD applies project restriction checks inconsistently between the originating and destination nodes, allowing a request that crosses a trust boundary to be treated as internally authorized without revalidating the target project's policy. This behavior maps to CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization, because access control decisions are not enforced for the requested operation and resource context.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may introduce prohibited instance configurations into a restricted project.
  • Project-level isolation controls could be weakened.
  • Unauthorized compute, storage, or network resources could be consumed.
  • Affected projects could experience policy violations or operational disruption.
  • The bypass could support further attacks if the introduced configuration has elevated capabilities.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authorization consistently at every node and trust boundary.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Revalidate the caller's permissions and target-project restrictions on the destination node.
  • Treat migration metadata as untrusted until authenticated and authorized independently.
  • Use secure-by-default project policies that deny prohibited configurations unless explicitly permitted.
  • Separate internal transport authentication from authorization to access project resources.
  • Apply least privilege to migration roles and limit cross-project migration capabilities.
  • Maintain auditable, tamper-resistant records of migration requests and authorization decisions.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for this class of issue through:

  • Static analysis of distributed request handlers for authorization checks that occur only on the originating node.
  • Code review signals showing internal-notification paths that bypass normal policy or project validation.
  • Tests that exercise cross-project operations across different cluster members and compare decisions at both ends.
  • Policy enforcement requiring explicit authorization for every destination project and resource type.
  • Audit monitoring for authenticated users creating instances or configurations in projects outside their normal scope.
  • Automated security review tools that flag trust-boundary transitions without repeated authorization.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/canonical/lxd/pull/18605
github.comgithub.com/canonical/lxd/pull/18651
github.comgithub.com/canonical/lxd/security/advisories/GHSA-v9wr-9r7q-fh4g

Frequently asked

questions

It may be exploitable over the LXD API by an authenticated user whose permissions allow the relevant migration operation. Exploitability depends on cluster exposure and the user's assigned capabilities.

Direct access to the destination node is generally not required when the attacker can submit an eligible migration request through the LXD cluster API. The key prerequisite is authenticated access with sufficient migration privileges.

Enforce authorization and project restriction checks again on the destination node, even when a request arrives through an authenticated internal cluster channel.

Model internal messages as untrusted at authorization boundaries, test every cross-project operation across nodes, apply least-privilege migration policies, and monitor audit logs for unexpected resource placement.

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