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CVE-2026-62279

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.1)

Authorization Bypass (CWE-639) in LubeLogger Records

CVE-2026-62279

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Broken Object-Level Authorization

CWE:

CWE-639

Impact:

Unauthorized data disclosure and data integrity compromise

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

LubeLogger contains an authorization flaw in its record-duplication workflow that allows an authenticated user to reference records belonging to another user.

When the user can edit a destination vehicle, missing authorization checks on source records may allow those records and related attachment paths to be copied into an attacker-controlled vehicle, causing unauthorized disclosure and persistent data duplication.

Affected context

The issue occurs in deployments that expose the record-duplication functionality and permit authenticated users to edit vehicles. The endpoint validates authorization for destination vehicles but may not verify that each source record belongs to a vehicle the requesting user is allowed to access. This condition can affect multiple record types, including maintenance, fuel, inspection, reminder, note, equipment, and related vehicle records.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Authenticated web application endpoint for duplicating records between vehicles
  • Required access: A valid user account with permission to edit at least one destination vehicle
  • Trigger point: Submission of caller-controlled source record identifiers and an authorized destination vehicle identifier
  • Why exploitation is possible: The destination vehicle authorization check is not consistently applied to the source vehicle associated with each requested record

Why this happens

The underlying bug is an object-level authorization failure caused by validating only the destination resource while trusting user-supplied identifiers for source records. The application retrieves records without confirming that the requester can access the vehicle owning each record, allowing cross-user object references to influence a state-changing operation. This behavior maps to CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key.

Potential impact

  • Sensitive record contents may be disclosed across user boundaries
  • Attachment paths or related storage metadata could be exposed
  • Unauthorized records may be copied into vehicles controlled by another user
  • Persistent duplicate data could undermine record integrity and auditing
  • Copied information could support further privacy or operational abuse

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally requires enforcing authorization for every object participating in a request, not only the destination object.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Verify source-record ownership or access permissions before retrieval and duplication
  • Derive permitted object relationships from the authenticated user context rather than trusting submitted identifiers
  • Apply consistent policy checks to every record type handled by the endpoint
  • Use centralized authorization helpers and deny-by-default behavior
  • Minimize exposure of attachment paths and other storage details
  • Run the application with least-privilege access to records and file storage
  • Add authorization tests for cross-user and cross-vehicle object references

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can identify similar flaws through:

  • Static analysis and code review checks for database lookups driven by request identifiers without adjacent authorization checks
  • Review of endpoints that copy, move, export, or associate objects across ownership boundaries
  • Tests that attempt cross-tenant source and destination combinations using authorized accounts
  • Runtime logging of denied and unusual cross-user object references
  • Policy enforcement requiring authorization checks before object retrieval and before state-changing operations
  • Automated security testing tools that model broken object-level authorization patterns

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/hargata/lubelog/commit/c8d5888ebc69e6a163e33f36200233ec845e5c57
github.comgithub.com/hargata/lubelog/issues/1398
github.comgithub.com/hargata/lubelog/pull/1395
github.comgithub.com/hargata/lubelog/releases/tag/v1.6.8
github.comgithub.com/hargata/lubelog/security/advisories/GHSA-3r34-mx83-q67r

Frequently asked

questions

An authenticated user may be able to exploit it if they can edit a destination vehicle and submit source record identifiers that refer to records outside their authorized scope.

It can be reached through the web application endpoint, subject to the deployment's network exposure and authentication controls.

Authorize every source record and its owning vehicle before retrieval or duplication, while retaining independent authorization for the destination vehicle.

Apply centralized, deny-by-default object authorization; avoid trusting client-supplied ownership relationships; and include cross-user authorization tests for all record-management workflows.

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