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CVE-2026-62278

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.1)

Path Traversal (CWE-22) in LubeLogger File Upload

CVE-2026-62278

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Path Traversal

CWE:

CWE-22

Impact:

Unauthorized File Placement or Overwrite

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

LubeLogger contains a path traversal vulnerability in its file-upload handling that allows authenticated non-administrative users to influence where uploaded files are moved. If a crafted upload name causes the resolved destination to escape the intended web-root or data directory, an attacker may place or overwrite files with the privileges of the application process.

Affected context

The issue occurs in LubeLogger deployments where authenticated users can access the translation-file upload functionality. The vulnerable file-handling path derives a destination from user-influenced file names and moves the uploaded file without confirming that the final absolute path remains within an approved storage directory. The risk depends on the application process having write access to locations outside the intended upload area.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Authenticated web-based file-upload functionality
  • Required access: A valid account with non-administrative access to the relevant upload endpoint
  • Trigger point: Processing and relocation of an uploaded translation file
  • Why exploitation is possible: User-controlled naming data influences the destination path, while canonical containment checks are not applied before the file move

Why this happens

The underlying bug is improper neutralization of path elements in a file name, mapping to CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory. The file-handling logic constructs a destination through string replacement and moves the file without resolving the resulting path and verifying that it remains beneath an explicitly permitted directory. This treats a user-influenced path component as trusted storage-location data.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may place files outside the intended upload directory
  • Existing files may be overwritten if the application process has sufficient permissions
  • Application behavior or content may be altered through unauthorized file placement
  • Sensitive files or execution-capable locations could be affected, depending on deployment permissions
  • The web application may be disrupted or exposed to further compromise

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing storage boundaries independently of user-provided names.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Resolve and canonicalize the complete destination path before any file operation
  • Verify that the resolved path is contained within an approved upload directory
  • Generate server-side file names rather than using user-controlled names as paths
  • Reject path separators, traversal components, and unexpected file-name forms
  • Keep uploaded content outside executable or publicly served locations where possible
  • Apply least-privilege permissions to the application process and upload directories
  • Use atomic file operations and collision-resistant handling to reduce unintended overwrites

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can identify similar weaknesses through:

  • Static analysis rules for file APIs receiving user-controlled path or name values
  • Code review checks for string-based path construction without canonical containment validation
  • Tests that verify uploads cannot resolve outside configured storage roots
  • Runtime monitoring for file creation, rename, or overwrite activity outside approved directories
  • Application policies that restrict upload destinations and permitted file types
  • Automated security review tools that flag unchecked path concatenation and file-move operations

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/hargata/lubelog/commit/c8d5888ebc69e6a163e33f36200233ec845e5c57
github.comgithub.com/hargata/lubelog/issues/1398
github.comgithub.com/hargata/lubelog/pull/1395
github.comgithub.com/hargata/lubelog/releases/tag/v1.6.8
github.comgithub.com/hargata/lubelog/security/advisories/GHSA-qm5x-mmwx-q7rm

Frequently asked

questions

Exploitation generally requires an authenticated account that can reach the affected translation-file upload functionality. Administrative privileges are not necessarily required.

Not necessarily. The direct effect is unauthorized file placement or overwriting, while further impact depends on writable locations, application permissions, file types, and deployment configuration.

Resolve the destination path canonically, verify it is contained within an approved storage directory, and preferably assign server-generated file names instead of trusting upload names.

Treat all file names and paths derived from requests as untrusted, enforce storage-root policies, test traversal-resistant upload behavior, and run the application with only the filesystem permissions it needs.

Find out what's already
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