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CVE-2026-62196

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.3)

AuthZ Bypass (CWE-863) via WhatsApp Group IDs

CVE-2026-62196

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Authorization Bypass

CWE:

CWE-863

Impact:

Privilege Escalation / Unauthorized Actions

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

OpenClaw contains an authorization bypass where WhatsApp group identifiers are incorrectly treated as satisfying higher-trust sender allowlists.

Under certain configurations, a lower-trust user can leverage group-based validation to perform actions that should require stronger, individual authorization.

Affected context

This vulnerability appears in OpenClaw deployments that:

  • Integrate with WhatsApp and use group-based identifiers for sender validation
  • Depend on allowlists to differentiate low-trust and high-trust senders
  • Treat WhatsApp group IDs as equivalent or sufficient to meet elevated authorization checks

The issue manifests when group membership or group IDs are accepted as a substitute for more restrictive, individually authorized sender identities.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Interfaces in OpenClaw that process WhatsApp-originated events or actions (e.g., commands, workflow triggers) using allowlists.
  • Required access: Ability to interact as a lower-trust sender that can participate in or reference WhatsApp groups processed by the system.
  • Trigger point: Invocation of features that rely on elevated sender allowlists, where group IDs are improperly accepted as satisfying those checks.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The authorization logic conflates group-based validation with high-trust, per-sender authorization, allowing group identifiers to bypass stricter access controls.

Why this happens

The underlying issue is flawed authorization logic that trusts contextual identifiers (WhatsApp group IDs) as if they were individually vetted, high-trust principals.

Instead of strictly enforcing allowlists for specific, strongly authenticated senders, the system treats group IDs as sufficient proof of elevated authorization.

This maps to CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization, where authorization checks are implemented but fail to enforce the intended security policy, allowing users with lower privileges to access higher-privileged operations.

Potential impact

  • Lower-trust users may perform actions intended only for high-trust or administrative senders.
  • Unauthorized execution of sensitive workflows or commands routed through WhatsApp interactions.
  • Escalation of privileges within business processes integrated with OpenClaw.
  • Potential data exposure or modification where operations are gated only by sender allowlists.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigations typically focus on tightening and clarifying authorization boundaries:

  • Ensure allowlists reference strongly authenticated, individual principals rather than group identifiers or contextual tokens.
  • Separate group membership checks from authorization checks so that being in a group does not automatically confer elevated privileges.
  • Apply explicit role- or attribute-based access control for high-impact actions, requiring a verifiable high-trust identity.
  • Implement defense-in-depth by requiring multiple independent conditions (e.g., sender identity plus explicit capability flags) for sensitive operations.
  • Regularly review access control policies to confirm they reflect actual security requirements rather than convenience assumptions.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection approaches can include:

  • Code review focusing on authorization paths that accept group IDs or other indirect identifiers in place of individually authorized senders.
  • Static analysis rules that flag authorization checks using group or channel identifiers as the primary trust anchor for privileged actions.
  • Logging and monitoring of privileged operations, including recording the source identifier type (individual vs group) and alerting on unexpected group-based initiations.
  • Security testing and QA scenarios that attempt to perform high-privilege actions from lower-trust accounts by manipulating group memberships or references.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-fh38-965w-f6c3
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-authorization-bypass-via-whatsapp-group-ids

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, it can be remotely exploitable if an attacker can interact with OpenClaw through WhatsApp or related integrations using a lower-trust account and relevant group contexts.

The attacker typically needs legitimate but low-trust access, such as membership in or interaction with WhatsApp groups that OpenClaw processes, without needing direct high-privilege credentials.

The safest pattern is to enforce authorization strictly on individually authenticated, high-trust principals for sensitive actions, ensuring group identifiers or contextual tokens can never substitute for direct allowlisted identities.

Adopt a clear access control model (e.g., RBAC or ABAC), avoid using group or channel IDs as primary trust anchors, include security reviews for any new authorization logic, and enforce automated checks that highlight reliance on non-individual identifiers for privileged operations.

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