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CVE-2026-62184

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

Improper Log Input Validation (CWE-116) in banIP

CVE-2026-62184

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Improper Input Validation in Log Parsing

CWE:

CWE-116

Impact:

Attack Evasion and Misblocking of Legitimate Users

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

luci-app-banip suffers from improper validation of log-derived input, where an awk-based parser naively extracts the first IPv4 address from each log line.

An unauthenticated remote attacker can craft a username containing an IP address, causing banIP to block that arbitrary IP instead of the actual attacker, undermining ban logic and evasion detection.

Affected context

This vulnerability appears in environments where luci-app-banip (banIP) consumes authentication or firewall logs and relies on an awk-based parser to identify offending IP addresses.

The parser is configured to extract the first IPv4 address from each log line without regard to which field represents the actual source IP.

When untrusted data such as login usernames are logged alongside genuine network information, crafted values can influence which IP address banIP interprets as the offender.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Remote interfaces that accept usernames or similar identifiers which are written into logs processed by banIP.
  • Required access: Ability to submit unauthenticated login attempts or other log-generating requests containing attacker-controlled text.
  • Trigger point: Log entries are generated, then banIP's awk-based parser scans each line and selects the first IPv4 address it finds.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The parser does not validate field positions or distinguish trusted IP fields from untrusted text fields, allowing attacker-supplied IPs in usernames to be treated as the source address for blocking.

Why this happens

The root cause is improper input validation and sanitization when extracting security-critical data from logs, aligning with CWE-116.

Instead of enforcing a strict schema or field mapping for log lines, the awk-based parser relies on a simplistic pattern match: "first IPv4-looking token equals offender IP."

This design treats mixed-trust log content as uniformly reliable, letting untrusted fields such as usernames influence ban decisions.

Conceptually, the bug is an insecure pattern where security logic (IP banning) depends on loosely parsed, attacker-controllable textual data without contextual validation of its origin or meaning.

Potential impact

  • banIP may block arbitrary, attacker-chosen IP addresses, including legitimate users or internal services.
  • Attackers can remain unblocked while proxies, gateways, or unrelated clients are mistakenly banned.
  • Automated abuse detection and rate limiting can be systematically evaded.
  • Incident response and auditing can be misled by incorrect attribution of malicious activity.
  • Overall reliability of IP-based blocking and reputation mechanisms can be degraded.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on tightening the trust model around log parsing and IP extraction.

Typical defensive patterns include:

  • Parsing logs using a well-defined schema that explicitly identifies the source IP field, rather than scanning for the first IPv4 pattern.
  • Ignoring or sanitizing attacker-controlled fields (e.g., usernames) when extracting addresses used for blocking decisions.
  • Applying strict validation rules so only IPs from designated, trusted log fields feed into ban lists.
  • Implementing defense-in-depth by combining IP bans with other signals (authentication failures, behavioral thresholds) to reduce reliance on any single, loosely parsed field.
  • Designing log formats that clearly separate user-supplied text from system-generated network metadata.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for this class of issue by:

  • Reviewing banIP and similar tooling configurations for generic "first IPv4 match" or pattern-based extraction instead of field-level parsing.
  • Using static analysis or grep-like searches to identify awk, sed, or regex-based IP extraction that does not reference explicit log fields.
  • Incorporating security-focused code review checklists that flag any logic where untrusted log content directly influences security controls such as bans or allowlists.
  • Employing automated configuration and script linting tools to detect insecure parsing patterns and missing validation around IP addresses and identifiers.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/openwrt/luci/commit/d9bbc372e29618a8807b693a1ccf6d0e42cd196c
github.comgithub.com/openwrt/luci/security/advisories/GHSA-r6hx-4f83-vp8m
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/luci-app-banip-log-monitor-ip-extraction-bypass

Frequently asked

questions

It is widely exploitable anywhere banIP processes logs containing attacker-controlled fields such as usernames, because the attacker only needs to generate log entries, not bypass authentication.

No. The described scenario allows unauthenticated remote attackers to exploit the vulnerability simply by submitting crafted login attempts or similar requests that are logged.

The safest approach is to base blocking decisions on strictly parsed, trusted log fields, ensuring that only the designated source IP field is used and that attacker-controlled text cannot influence the ban list.

Future designs should treat logs as mixed-trust data, clearly separate user-supplied content from system metadata, enforce schema-based parsing, and include validation rules that prevent untrusted fields from driving security decisions such as bans or throttling.

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