Summary
SourceCodester Pharmacy Sales and Inventory System 1.0 contains a SQL injection vulnerability in the /ajax.php?action=delete_sales endpoint, where the ID parameter is used unsafely in a database query.
A remote attacker can manipulate this parameter to alter backend SQL queries, potentially exposing or modifying data, or disrupting application behavior when the vulnerable function is invoked.
Affected context
This vulnerability exists in SourceCodester Pharmacy Sales and Inventory System 1.0 within the AJAX handler at /ajax.php?action=delete_sales.
The issue arises when the ID argument provided by the client is processed by server-side code and incorporated into a SQL statement without adequate validation or parameterization.
Deployments that expose this endpoint to untrusted networks or users, and that rely on traditional relational databases, are more likely to be impacted.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: HTTP request to /ajax.php with the query parameter action=delete_sales (typically via GET or POST).
- Required access: Ability to send crafted requests to the application; no special privileges are assumed beyond normal web access.
- Trigger point: The server-side code constructs and executes a SQL statement using the attacker-controlled ID parameter.
- Why exploitation is possible: The ID value is concatenated or interpolated directly into the SQL query without using parameterized statements or sufficient input sanitization, allowing the attacker to inject arbitrary SQL fragments.
Why this happens
The root cause is improper neutralization of special elements in SQL commands, aligning with CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection').
The delete_sales logic appears to build SQL queries by directly embedding the ID parameter from the client into the query string.
Without prepared statements, bound parameters, or a robust query builder that separates data from code, the database interprets portions of the attacker-supplied ID as part of the SQL command itself.
This pattern reflects a broader class of injection flaws covered by CWE-74: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component, where untrusted data is sent to another component (the database) without proper encoding or parameterization.
Potential impact
- May allow unauthorized deletion of sales records or related entities.
- Could enable exfiltration of sensitive data through UNION-based or error-based SQL injection techniques.
- May allow modification of inventory, pricing, or transactional data, impacting business integrity and reporting.
- Could be leveraged to escalate impact to full database compromise, including creation of new accounts or manipulation of application settings stored in the database.
- Can lead to service disruption if queries are crafted to lock tables, drop objects, or exhaust database resources.
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation relies on structurally separating SQL code from user-supplied data and reducing trust in external inputs:
- Prefer parameterized queries or prepared statements for all database operations, ensuring that user inputs (such as ID) are bound as data values rather than concatenated into query strings.
- Use an ORM or query builder that enforces parameter binding by default and discourages ad hoc string-based SQL construction.
- Apply strict server-side validation and type-checking to input parameters, especially identifiers; for example, ensure IDs conform to expected numeric formats before they reach the data access layer.
- Implement least-privilege database accounts so that the application's DB user can perform only the minimal operations required, limiting the blast radius of any injection.
- Introduce centralized input handling patterns (e.g., middleware or service layers) where all external parameters are normalized and validated before reaching SQL execution paths.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection efforts can focus on both code-level review and runtime behavior:
- Use static application security testing (SAST) tools configured with rules for detecting string-based SQL query construction that incorporates request parameters directly.
- During manual code review, flag patterns where $_GET, $_POST, or other request variables flow into SQL strings without passing through a parameterization layer.
- Implement database activity monitoring and logging to surface anomalous query patterns, such as unexpected UNION operators, comment sequences, or unusually long ID values.
- Employ dynamic application security testing (DAST) or interactive application security testing (IAST) tools to probe endpoints like /ajax.php?action=delete_sales for injection behavior.
- Integrate secure coding guidelines and automated checks into the CI/CD pipeline so that future additions or modifications to data access code are evaluated for injection risks.

