Summary
Simple Content Management System 1.0 contains a SQL injection vulnerability in /web/admin/login.php, where the User parameter is incorporated into database queries without proper sanitization.
A remote attacker can manipulate this parameter to alter SQL queries, potentially bypassing authentication, extracting sensitive data, or modifying application state when the login endpoint is reachable.
Affected context
The issue occurs in the administrative login functionality of Simple Content Management System 1.0 at /web/admin/login.php.
It manifests when user-supplied input from the User parameter is embedded directly into backend SQL statements without parameterization or adequate escaping.
Any deployment where this admin login is exposed over a network and connected to a relational database is potentially affected, especially if it relies on the login form for access control.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Remote HTTP(S) access to
/web/admin/login.php - Required access: No prior authentication; attacker only needs the ability to submit crafted login requests
- Trigger point: Processing of the
Userparameter during authentication, where its value is passed into a SQL query - Why exploitation is possible: The application dynamically constructs SQL queries using string concatenation or interpolation with untrusted
Userinput, without using prepared statements or robust input validation, enabling arbitrary SQL fragments to be executed by the database
Why this happens
This vulnerability stems from constructing SQL queries directly from user-controlled input in the User parameter within /web/admin/login.php.
Instead of using parameterized queries or a safe query builder, the code likely concatenates the provided username into a SQL statement, trusting it as data.
This pattern maps to CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection'), and is closely related to CWE-74: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output when user input is not safely encoded or parameterized before being embedded into commands.
The underlying bug class is the failure to consistently separate code from data, allowing attacker-controlled strings to change the structure and logic of database queries.
Potential impact
- Bypass of administrative authentication and unauthorized access to the admin interface
- Retrieval of sensitive data from the database, including user information or configuration details
- Modification or deletion of application data, impacting content integrity and availability
- Creation of new privileged accounts or escalation of privileges within the CMS
- Potential disclosure of database schema and internal implementation details
- In some environments, potential for secondary impacts such as server-side data exfiltration via SQL functions
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation focuses on ensuring that user input cannot alter the structure of SQL commands:
- Prefer parameterized queries or prepared statements for all database operations, binding user-supplied values as parameters rather than concatenating them into query strings.
- Use a trusted database abstraction layer or ORM that encourages safe query construction patterns by default.
- Apply strict input validation for authentication fields (e.g., usernames), constraining them to expected character sets and lengths, and rejecting or normalizing unexpected input rather than attempting to sanitize arbitrary SQL meta-characters.
- Centralize database access logic so that any new query paths must follow established secure patterns.
- Implement least-privilege database accounts, ensuring the application's DB user has only the minimum permissions required, which can reduce impact if an injection occurs.
- Consider generic error handling that avoids exposing raw database errors, while still logging enough detail server-side for investigation.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection typically involves combining static analysis, review practices, and runtime monitoring:
- Static analysis: Configure rules or linters to flag dynamic SQL construction using string concatenation or interpolation, especially where values originate from request parameters like
$_GET,$_POST, or frameworks' input APIs. - Code review: During manual review, treat any login or authentication-related SQL construction as a high-risk area, and verify that all queries use prepared statements and well-defined parameter binding.
- Security testing: Use automated web vulnerability scanners and targeted penetration testing to send crafted payloads to
/web/admin/login.phpand observe for SQL error messages, anomalous behavior, or authentication bypass. - Logging and monitoring: Implement detailed server-side logs for failed login attempts, capturing unusual patterns (e.g., repeated use of SQL meta-characters) and integrating with alerting systems.
- Policy enforcement: Enforce development guidelines that prohibit raw SQL string concatenation in application code, optionally backed by pre-commit hooks or CI checks to block non-compliant changes.

