Summary
A path validation flaw in Wazuh cluster file synchronization allows a party holding the cluster key to write, overwrite, or delete files at attacker-selected locations within /var/ossec on worker nodes. If a selected path is used by a root-privileged component, this may enable remote code execution as root.
Affected context
The vulnerability affects Wazuh cluster deployments using vulnerable file synchronization logic on worker nodes. The risk arises when a cluster peer can submit synchronization requests and the worker relies only on a path-confinement check that keeps destinations under /var/ossec, without confirming that each file remains within the directory associated with its declared cluster item. The same validation gap can affect deletion operations.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Wazuh cluster file synchronization between manager and worker nodes
- Required access: Possession or control of the cluster key, together with the ability to act as a trusted cluster peer
- Trigger point: Processing of file write, overwrite, or delete synchronization requests on a worker
- Why exploitation is possible: The worker confirms that a destination remains under
/var/ossecbut does not consistently verify that it is within the expected item-specific directory
Why this happens
The underlying bug is incomplete path validation in a file synchronization routine. A destination derived from attacker-influenced synchronization metadata is constrained to a broad base directory, but the implementation does not enforce the narrower directory associated with the requested cluster item on every execution branch. This maps to CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory, because a trusted file-management operation can be redirected to unintended locations within the permitted root.
Potential impact
- An attacker may write or overwrite files within
/var/ossec - An attacker may delete files required by Wazuh or related services
- Root-privileged components could execute attacker-controlled content
- Worker nodes could be fully compromised
- Monitoring, detection, or response capabilities could be disrupted
- Attackers could gain opportunities for lateral movement or data tampering
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing destination-specific path authorization throughout every file synchronization branch.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Canonicalizing and validating paths against both the permitted base directory and the expected item-specific directory
- Applying identical authorization checks to create, overwrite, move, and delete operations
- Rejecting symbolic-link and other filesystem redirection conditions where appropriate
- Treating cluster credentials as high-value secrets and limiting their distribution
- Running worker services with only the filesystem and operating-system privileges they require
- Separating writable synchronization areas from directories consumed by root-privileged processes
- Auditing synchronized files and alerting on unexpected destinations or changes
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for this weakness through:
- Static analysis rules that trace user- or peer-controlled path components into file move, delete, or overwrite operations
- Code review checks confirming that every control-flow branch applies the same canonical-path and directory-boundary validation
- Tests involving sibling directories, nested paths, symbolic links, and delete operations
- Runtime monitoring for unusual file changes under
/var/ossec, especially changes to executable, startup, or service-consumed paths - Network and identity policy checks that restrict which systems may participate in cluster synchronization
- Automated security review tools that flag incomplete path validation and inconsistent checks across branches

