Summary
A path traversal vulnerability in Weblate's App store metadata download feature allows a project administrator to read files outside the project's repository. The issue becomes risky when attacker-influenced paths are resolved without reliably confining them to the intended repository directory.
Affected context
The vulnerability affects Weblate deployments using the App store metadata download functionality in versions before 2026.7. It occurs when a project-administrator-level user can influence a metadata path and the resulting file access is not fully restricted to the associated repository. This issue represents an incomplete remediation of an earlier path traversal vulnerability.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Weblate's App store metadata download feature - Required access: Project administrator privileges - Trigger point: Processing and resolving an attacker-influenced metadata
file path
- Why exploitation is possible: Path resolution does not consistently
enforce repository confinement, allowing references to files outside the
intended directory
Why this happens
The underlying bug is insufficient canonicalization and confinement of user-influenced filesystem paths. A path is accepted for repository-related access without reliably verifying that its resolved location remains beneath the authorized repository root. This maps primarily to CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal'), with related concerns involving link resolution (CWE-59) and incomplete application of a security control (CWE-693).
Potential impact
- An attacker may read sensitive files from the Weblate host.
- Exposed files could contain credentials, configuration data, or source code.
- The disclosure could enable follow-on compromise of connected services.
- Project or organizational confidentiality could be reduced.
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing a single trusted repository root for every file access. Common defensive patterns include canonicalizing paths before authorization, rejecting traversal components, verifying that resolved paths remain descendants of the permitted directory, and handling symbolic links according to an explicit security policy. File access should use secure-by-default APIs, minimize trust in user-controlled metadata, and run application processes with only the filesystem privileges they require.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection can include static analysis for filesystem APIs that concatenate user-controlled values, especially where canonicalization and containment checks are absent. Code review should examine repository download handlers, archive or metadata processing, symbolic-link behavior, and authorization after path resolution. Runtime monitoring can alert on repository features accessing unexpected host paths, while policy enforcement can restrict Weblate service accounts from reading sensitive locations. Automated security review tools may help identify incomplete traversal defenses.

