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CVE-2026-61775

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.8)

Unsafe Deserialization (CWE-502) in NVIDIA Megatron Bridge

CVE-2026-61775

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Unsafe Deserialization

CWE:

CWE-502

Impact:

Code Execution, Data Tampering, and Information Disclosure

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

NVIDIA Megatron Bridge contains an unsafe deserialization vulnerability that may allow untrusted data to be processed in a way that enables code execution, data tampering, or information disclosure. The risk becomes significant when an attacker can supply or influence serialized data consumed by the affected component.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in NVIDIA Megatron Bridge deployments or workflows that deserialize data from a source that is not fully trusted. Exploitability depends on whether an attacker can introduce, replace, or influence serialized input before it is processed, and on the permissions available to the affected process.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: A Megatron Bridge workflow or component that accepts serialized data
  • Required access: The ability to provide or modify data that reaches the deserialization operation
  • Trigger point: Processing of attacker-controlled or tampered serialized input
  • Why exploitation is possible: The deserialization path may interpret data as executable object structure rather than treating it strictly as inert data

Why this happens

The underlying issue is unsafe deserialization, mapped to CWE-502. A deserializer processes untrusted serialized content using capabilities that may reconstruct executable objects or invoke behavior during object creation. This insecure trust boundary can turn data supplied by an attacker into code execution or other unintended application actions.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may execute code with the privileges of the affected process.
  • Sensitive information could be disclosed from the runtime environment.
  • Training data, model artifacts, or configuration could be modified or corrupted.
  • The affected workload could be used to access connected services or systems.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on removing implicit trust from deserialization boundaries.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Use data-only, safe, or allowlisted deserialization formats and APIs.
  • Avoid deserializers that reconstruct arbitrary classes or invoke callbacks.
  • Validate input against a strict schema before it is accepted by application logic.
  • Reduce the ability of untrusted users, jobs, or storage locations to supply serialized data.
  • Run workloads with least privilege and isolate model-processing components from sensitive systems.
  • Apply integrity controls, provenance checks, and controlled artifact distribution for serialized inputs.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection approaches can include:

  • Static analysis rules for generic or unsafe deserialization APIs.
  • Code review checks for deserialization of files, network responses, model artifacts, or job inputs without an explicit trust boundary.
  • Dependency and policy scanning for serializers that support arbitrary object reconstruction.
  • Runtime monitoring for unexpected child processes, filesystem changes, outbound connections, or access to sensitive resources after deserialization.
  • CI enforcement requiring approved data-only formats and schema validation for externally sourced artifacts.

Automated code review and software composition analysis tools may help identify unsafe serialization patterns before deployment.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/NVIDIA/product-security/tree/main/2026/5868
nvd.nist.govnvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61775
cve.orgcve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-61775

Frequently asked

questions

Exploitability depends on deployment architecture. Remote exploitation may be possible if untrusted serialized data can reach the affected component through a network-accessible workflow or service.

An attacker generally needs a way to provide, replace, or influence serialized input processed by NVIDIA Megatron Bridge. The required permissions depend on how artifacts, jobs, and data sources are controlled.

Replace unsafe deserialization with a data-only or strictly allowlisted format, then validate the resulting data against an explicit schema before use.

Establish clear trust boundaries for serialized artifacts, restrict who can publish or modify them, enforce least privilege, and add static-analysis and CI policies that prohibit unsafe deserialization patterns.

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