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CVE-2026-61773

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.8)

Unsafe Deserialization (CWE-502) in NVIDIA Megatron Bridge

CVE-2026-61773

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Unsafe Deserialization

CWE:

CWE-502

Impact:

Code Execution, Data Tampering, and Information Disclosure

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

NVIDIA Megatron Bridge contains an unsafe deserialization vulnerability that may allow untrusted data to be processed as executable object information. Under conditions where an attacker can provide or influence serialized input, successful exploitation could lead to code execution, data tampering, or information disclosure.

Affected context

The vulnerability may occur in NVIDIA Megatron Bridge workflows that deserialize data from sources not fully controlled by the application or deployment owner. Risk depends on whether an attacker can introduce, replace, or influence serialized input processed by the affected component, and on the privileges available to the process performing deserialization.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Data or configuration paths that accept serialized input
  • Required access: Ability to supply or influence data consumed by the affected deserialization process
  • Trigger point: Processing of attacker-controlled or otherwise untrusted serialized data
  • Why exploitation is possible: Deserialization may reconstruct objects or invoke behaviors beyond passive data parsing

Why this happens

The underlying issue is the use of a deserialization mechanism that does not sufficiently constrain the types, objects, or behaviors reconstructed from input. When serialized data is treated as trusted despite being attacker-influenced, specially crafted content may trigger unintended object creation or execution. This behavior maps to CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may execute code with the privileges of the affected process.
  • Sensitive information could be disclosed.
  • Application, model, or training data could be altered or corrupted.
  • Downstream workflows may be manipulated through tampered data or artifacts.
  • A compromised process could be used for further access, depending on its permissions and environment.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on preventing untrusted serialized data from reaching permissive deserialization paths.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Prefer data-only formats and safe parsing APIs that do not reconstruct executable objects.
  • Apply explicit type allowlists and strict schema validation before accepting input.
  • Reduce input trust by authenticating sources, protecting artifact locations, and validating integrity.
  • Run deserialization and model-processing tasks with least-privilege identities and restricted filesystem, network, and runtime permissions.
  • Treat externally supplied checkpoints, artifacts, and intermediate data as untrusted by default.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can identify similar risks through:

  • Static analysis rules for generic or permissive deserialization APIs.
  • Code review checks for deserialization of files, artifacts, messages, or model data from external sources.
  • Data-flow analysis tracing user-controlled or externally retrieved input into object reconstruction functions.
  • Policy enforcement requiring approved data-only serialization formats and explicit schema validation.
  • Runtime monitoring for unexpected child processes, filesystem changes, network connections, or artifact modifications from data-processing components.

Automated security review tools may help detect unsafe parser usage and missing input-validation controls.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/NVIDIA/product-security/tree/main/2026/5868
nvd.nist.govnvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61773
cve.orgcve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-61773

Frequently asked

questions

Exploitability depends on deployment and data-flow conditions. It may be reachable remotely if an exposed service, pipeline, repository, or artifact exchange allows an attacker to influence serialized input.

The attacker generally needs a way to provide, replace, or modify data that NVIDIA Megatron Bridge later deserializes. The required access may range from access to an input service to permissions over stored artifacts or shared files.

Avoid deserializing untrusted data with permissive object reconstruction. Use a data-only format or restricted parser, enforce an allowlisted schema, and validate input before processing it.

Establish trusted artifact pipelines, verify input integrity, restrict deserialization privileges, and use static analysis and code-review policies that flag unsafe deserialization paths.

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