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CVE-2026-61772

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.8)

Unsafe Deserialization (CWE-502) in NVIDIA Megatron Bridge

CVE-2026-61772

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Unsafe Deserialization

CWE:

CWE-502

Impact:

Code Execution, Data Tampering, and Information Disclosure

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

NVIDIA Megatron Bridge contains an unsafe deserialization vulnerability that may allow untrusted data to be interpreted in a way that triggers unintended object behavior.

If an attacker can supply or alter data processed by the affected deserialization path, successful exploitation could result in code execution, data tampering, or information disclosure.

Affected context

The vulnerability may occur in NVIDIA Megatron Bridge deployments that deserialize data originating outside a fully trusted control boundary. Risk depends on whether an attacker can provide, replace, or influence serialized input before it is processed, and on the privileges available to the component performing deserialization.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Application or workflow components that deserialize externally supplied or mutable data
  • Required access: Ability to provide, modify, or cause processing of serialized input
  • Trigger point: Deserialization of the attacker-influenced data
  • Why exploitation is possible: The deserialization process may reconstruct unsafe objects or invoke unintended behavior before the data is sufficiently constrained or validated

Why this happens

The underlying issue is the use of a deserialization mechanism that treats serialized input as capable of defining object behavior rather than only representing data. When untrusted content is processed without strict type restrictions, attackers may influence object construction or related execution paths.

This maps to CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data, which occurs when an application reconstructs objects from data that has not been established as trustworthy.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may execute code with the privileges of the affected process.
  • Sensitive information could be disclosed from the application environment.
  • Model, training, or workflow data could be modified or corrupted.
  • Downstream systems could receive tampered data or altered processing results.
  • A compromised process could be used for further movement within an accessible environment.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on preventing untrusted serialized content from reaching executable object reconstruction paths.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Using data-only serialization formats and safe parsers that do not construct arbitrary objects.
  • Restricting deserialization to an explicit allowlist of expected types and fields.
  • Validating structure, size, encoding, and semantics before processing input.
  • Reducing trust in files, artifacts, checkpoints, and other data exchanged across workflow boundaries.
  • Applying least-privilege permissions and isolating deserialization workloads.
  • Avoiding unnecessary code execution capabilities in worker environments.
  • Protecting serialized artifacts with controlled access, integrity verification, and provenance checks.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection approaches may include:

  • Static analysis for generic or unsafe deserialization APIs and object reconstruction hooks.
  • Code review checks for deserialization of files, network content, model artifacts, or user-controlled data.
  • Dependency and policy scanning for libraries or configurations that permit arbitrary object loading.
  • Runtime monitoring for unexpected child processes, filesystem changes, outbound connections, or access to sensitive resources after deserialization.
  • CI enforcement requiring approved data-only formats and explicit type restrictions.

Automated code review and software composition analysis tools can help identify risky deserialization patterns, but findings should be evaluated against the actual trust boundary and execution context.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/NVIDIA/product-security/tree/main/2026/5868
nvd.nist.govnvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61772
cve.orgcve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-61772

Frequently asked

questions

Exploitability depends on the deployment and data flow. It may be reachable remotely when an exposed service accepts attacker-controlled serialized input, but it may instead require access to files, artifacts, or workflows processed by the component.

An attacker generally needs the ability to provide, replace, or influence serialized data that NVIDIA Megatron Bridge will deserialize. The resulting impact also depends on the privileges of the affected process.

The safest pattern is to replace unsafe object deserialization with a data-only parser, enforce an allowlist of permitted structures, and validate input before it reaches sensitive processing logic.

Treat serialized artifacts as untrusted by default, protect their integrity and access, use least-privilege execution, and enforce secure deserialization policies through code review, static analysis, and CI checks.

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