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CVE-2026-61770

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.8)

Unsafe Deserialization (CWE-502) in NVIDIA Megatron Bridge

CVE-2026-61770

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Unsafe Deserialization

CWE:

CWE-502

Impact:

Code Execution, Data Tampering, and Information Disclosure

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

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Summary

NVIDIA Megatron Bridge contains an unsafe deserialization vulnerability that may allow untrusted data to be interpreted in a way that enables code execution. Depending on deployment permissions and the affected data-processing path, successful exploitation could also permit data tampering or information disclosure.

Affected context

The vulnerability may occur in NVIDIA Megatron Bridge deployments that deserialize data from sources an attacker can influence. Risk is higher when serialized input is accepted without strict type restrictions, integrity checks, or isolation, particularly in environments where the processing component has access to sensitive data or elevated permissions.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: A Megatron Bridge workflow or component that processes serialized data
  • Required access: Ability to supply, modify, or influence data reaching the deserialization operation
  • Trigger point: Deserialization of attacker-controlled or otherwise untrusted input
  • Why exploitation is possible: The deserialization process may reconstruct unsafe objects or invoke unintended behavior before the input is fully trusted or constrained

Why this happens

The underlying issue is the use of a deserialization mechanism that treats untrusted serialized data as capable of defining executable object behavior. When type construction or object restoration is not limited to an approved set of data structures, specially crafted input may trigger unintended code paths. This maps to CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may execute code in the affected process context
  • Sensitive information could be disclosed
  • Application or training data could be modified or poisoned
  • Processing integrity and downstream outputs could be compromised
  • A compromised process could provide a foothold for further activity, depending on its permissions

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on removing executable behavior from deserialization boundaries and reducing trust in serialized input.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Using data-only, schema-constrained parsers instead of general-purpose object deserialization
  • Allowing only explicitly approved primitive types and structures
  • Verifying input integrity and provenance before processing
  • Separating parsing from validation and rejecting unexpected fields or types
  • Running processing workloads with least-privilege identities and limited filesystem, network, and data access
  • Avoiding deserialization of untrusted data when a simpler interchange format is sufficient

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can identify similar risks through:

  • Static analysis rules for unsafe deserialization libraries, APIs, and object reconstruction hooks
  • Code review checks for serialized input crossing trust boundaries
  • Searches for permissive loaders, dynamic type resolution, or validation performed after deserialization
  • Runtime monitoring for unexpected child processes, filesystem access, or network activity from data-processing workers
  • Policy enforcement requiring approved data formats and restricted parser configurations

Automated security review tools may help flag suspicious deserialization patterns during development.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/NVIDIA/product-security/tree/main/2026/5868
nvd.nist.govnvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61770
cve.orgcve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-61770

Frequently asked

questions

Exploitability depends on whether an attacker can provide or alter serialized data processed by the affected Megatron Bridge workflow. The available description does not establish a specific network exposure.

Authentication requirements depend on deployment architecture and data-access controls. The key prerequisite is the ability to influence input that reaches the deserialization boundary.

Replace general-purpose object deserialization with a data-only parser that enforces an allowlist of types and validates the complete structure before use.

Treat serialized input as untrusted, enforce provenance and integrity controls, apply least privilege to processing workloads, and include deserialization checks in code review and automated security policies.

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