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CVE-2026-61769

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.8)

Unsafe Deserialization (CWE-502) in NVIDIA Megatron Bridge

CVE-2026-61769

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Unsafe Deserialization

CWE:

CWE-502

Impact:

Code Execution, Data Tampering, and Information Disclosure

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

NVIDIA Megatron Bridge contains an unsafe deserialization vulnerability that may allow untrusted data to be processed as executable object data.

A successful exploit could enable code execution, data tampering, or information disclosure when attacker-controlled serialized content reaches the vulnerable deserialization path.

Affected context

The vulnerability may occur in Megatron Bridge deployments that deserialize data from sources an attacker can influence or replace. Risk depends on the application's trust boundaries, the formats being processed, and whether deserialization occurs with permissive object-construction behavior.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Application or workflow components that deserialize serialized data
  • Required access: Ability to supply, modify, or cause processing of untrusted serialized content
  • Trigger point: Deserialization of the attacker-controlled data
  • Why exploitation is possible: Permissive deserialization may reconstruct objects or invoke behaviors beyond passive data parsing

Why this happens

The underlying issue is the use of a deserialization mechanism that treats untrusted serialized input as capable of defining executable object state. This behavior maps to CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data, where attacker-controlled content can cause unintended object creation, method invocation, or other runtime effects instead of being treated solely as data.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may execute code in the affected process context
  • Application or training data could be modified or tampered with
  • Sensitive information may be disclosed
  • Compromised workloads could be used for further access or disruption

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on eliminating unsafe deserialization paths and reducing trust in serialized inputs.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Prefer simple data-only formats and safe, restricted parsers
  • Disable arbitrary object reconstruction and executable deserialization features
  • Validate input against a strict schema before use
  • Authenticate and integrity-protect serialized artifacts where appropriate
  • Restrict file, network, and process privileges of affected workloads
  • Avoid processing serialized content from untrusted locations by default

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can assess this risk through:

  • Static analysis for generic or permissive deserialization APIs
  • Code review checks for object reconstruction from external input
  • Inventory and policy enforcement for serialized data formats and parser settings
  • Runtime monitoring for unexpected child processes, file changes, or outbound connections after deserialization
  • Automated security review tools that flag untrusted data flowing into deserialization sinks

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/NVIDIA/product-security/tree/main/2026/5868
nvd.nist.govnvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61769
cve.orgcve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-61769

Frequently asked

questions

Exploitability depends on deployment exposure and whether an attacker can deliver or influence serialized data processed by Megatron Bridge. The available description does not establish a specific network attack path.

It may require access to an input, artifact, workflow, or storage location that the affected component processes. Required privileges depend on the deployment's access controls.

Replace unsafe object deserialization with a data-only, restricted parser and enforce schema validation before accepting the content.

Define explicit trust boundaries for serialized data, restrict accepted formats, protect artifacts with integrity controls, and run processing workloads with least privilege.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.